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Gene editing in humans has long been a topic of ethical debate. Although gene
editing techniques have been in development for many years now, the emergence of
a faster and cheaper method, CRISPR (Clustered, Regularly Interspaced Short
Palindromic Repeats), is increasing the urgency of such debates. CRISPR has been
recognised as a ‘game-changer’ across the scientific community and in commercial
spheres, offering potential for life-saving treatments and even the eradication of
serious diseases in humans. However, the speed and affordability of CRISPR lends it
towards widespread use outside of laboratory settings, and is outstripping the pace
of the current regulatory policies on gene editing applications. There remains a
concerning gap between CRISPR technology and policies regulating its use in an
ethically sound, safe manner, not only for this generation, but for generations to
come. In Aotearoa New Zealand, there has not been an official review of gene editing
policy in over two decades, well before the emergence of CRISPR as a major player
in biotechnology. This project will compare major normative accounts of
consequentialism and deontology with various accounts of virtue ethics, explaining
why consequentialist and deontological processes will not be up to the task of
guiding responses to ethically complex gene editing cases on their own. This work
shifts the focus to decision-makers tasked with determining the most ethical course
of action on individual cases pertaining to CRISPR uses in Aotearoa New Zealand. I
propose a novel ‘toolkit’ of virtues developed from virtue ethics traditions, grounded
in principles of Tikanga Māori, in combination with a casuist approach to individual
cases. This approach aims to empower decision makers to consider and account for
the broader aspects of such decisions. As the issues in this project concern complex
and multifaceted issues, this thesis will not uncover any specific, definitive answers
regarding individual issues. In fact, one of my primary concerns is that we should
resist very generalised, top-down pronouncements regarding particular cases of
gene editing. Rather, the framework outlined in this thesis presents a new approach
to addressing such issues, one that I believe warrants further exploration.
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Introduction
In 2019, researchers at Griffiths University in Australia claimed to be on the cusp of
a cure for cervical cancer using breakthrough gene editing technology, CRISPR
(Clustered, Regularly Interspaced, Short Palindromic Repeats) (Irving, 2019). Using
the CRISPR method on mice, scientists were able to isolate, disrupt and remove the
cancer-causing genes without affecting any healthy cells in 100% of test subjects.
Based on these results, there are plans to trial the treatment in humans in as early as
2024. This exciting news highlights just one of the emerging possibilities of human
gene editing through technology like CRISPR.
In the following chapters, I will explain why the possibilities opening up for
treatment of diseases and human enhancement through CRISPR makes setting rigid
regulations increasingly difficult, and that the pace of such technological advances
renders management at a legal and policy level especially challenging. In response, I
propose a novel, flexible, values-based approach to such ethically difficult cases,
showing why this is worth exploring. As gene editing technologies rapidly advance,
into realms previously thought of as being science fiction, we must develop a new
approach to managing the ethical demands of such possibilities for humans, both
now and into the future.
Gene editing, particularly in humans, has long been a topic of ethical debate.
Although gene editing practices and techniques have been in development for many
years now, the emergence of faster and cheaper methods such as CRISPR are
increasing the level of urgency to engage in such ethical debates in formulating
policy and making ethically sound decisions that can adequately regulate gene
editing towards the good of the general public (Caplan, A. L., Parent, B., Plunkett, C.,
& Shen, M. 2015). The vast potential of gene editing techniques such as CRISPR has
been recognised across the scientific community and in commercial spheres, giving
rise to urgent debate on the ethical, legal and economic ramifications of widespread
use.
However, the speed and efficiency of CRISPR is outstripping the pace of current
regulatory policies around the research practices, management and implications of
gene editing, in plants, animals and in the very near future, humans. There is
potential for life saving treatments and even the eradication of serious diseases. One
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of the many problems with rapidly developing technology is that without adequate
policy concerning the ethical issues of such practices, unbridled gene editing
practices place humanity as we know it under tremendous risk of increased inequity
through eugenics, carried forward through generations.
One problem to address is that current literature on the ethical challenges to gene
editing indicates a lack of clear consensus on how policymakers ought to begin
creating robust regulatory policy that keeps pace with the speed of such technology.
Reviewing research on the ethics of gene editing reveals a concerning gap between
the pace of technology development and creating regulations for applying such
technology in an ethically sound, safe manner, both now and for generations to
come.
As people develop the ability to alter a species - including their own - according to
their desires and uses, then it is vital to examine the moral philosophical value
systems that motivate this. This work offers a critical examination of the value
systems that underpin ethical decision-making as it pertains to the practical uses of
such technology.
This project aims to apply ethical recommendations towards the practice of gene
editing through the lens of normative philosophical theories. I will focus on virtue
ethics, in comparison to consequentialism and deontology and show why a flexible,
values based approach is a serious contender as a normative basis for decisions on
gene editing applications.
This research is important for multiple reasons, most notably including the potential
ramifications of gene editing that will extend beyond the current generation.
Creating policy that regulates the use of such techniques should be grounded in
critical thought and a clear value system directed towards furthering human
flourishing both now and in generations to come. It is therefore necessary to discuss
what is meant by ‘human flourishing’, in order to make decisions that are directed
towards this aim. Furthermore, a critical examination of the normative philosophical
theories such as consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics is necessary to
uncover their ability to meet the ethical challenges and move towards these ideas of
‘human flourishing’.
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There are two main sections to this project. The first section outlines the problem. I
will explain CRISPR technology and list some of its potential applications in
humans. I will outline the ethical challenges of gene editing that this technology has
brought to urgency and why it is unique. I will summarise the global response to
gene editing and compare it to Aotearoa New Zealand’s current response, discussing
its ability to robustly meet these unique moral and ethical challenges presented by
CRISPR.
The second section proposes a framework to address these issues. I will outline
virtue ethics as a normative theory and critically evaluate its ability to meet the
ethical complexities of gene editing, in comparison to consequentialist or deontic
theories, showing why developing a network of virtues to guide decision-makers on
gene editing policy is a viable option. I will outline my own set of virtues I see as
essential to this task in Aotearoa New Zealand. In response to a common critique of
virtue ethics, being a lack of specific action guidance, I propose a combination of
casuistry methods in conjunction with the virtues to provide support and structure
to a values based approach. To demonstrate my theory, I will discuss how the
combined theories of virtue ethics and casuistry can inform ethical decisions within
specific cases.
This research presents recommendations framed in a way that could inform
decision-makers on the ethical approaches to gene editing both globally and in
Aotearoa New Zealand. As the issues in this project are complex and multifaceted,
this work cannot represent the definitive, final answer to specific cases. However, it
will shed light on the complex ethical issues at play and uncover a gap in Aotearoa
New Zealand’s present policy response to gene editing practice. This project
highlights the need for deeper, values based discussion around gene editing
practices. In particular, I advocate for the inclusion of virtue ethics alongside
standardly held approaches for further research in this kind of applied field.
Finally, using a case study, I will conduct a thorough analysis of how these issues can
be seen in a more nuanced way using a combined philosophical framework of virtue
ethics and casuistry. This work will show that these two normative theories work
together as valuable tools that better position decision-makers in approaching the
task of making ethical judgements in human gene editing applications through
CRISPR.
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Chapter 1: Introducing CRISPR-Cas9
This section introduces CRISPR-Cas9 as a breakthrough technological tool in gene
editing. I will summarise how it was discovered and how it works in comparison to
other gene editing technologies with a view to explaining why CRISPR-Cas9 has
been touted as a game-changer for gene editing into the future and thus, for ethics
too. Using examples of its current and proposed applications in humans, I will
introduce some of the potential promises and pitfalls for its widespread use.
1.1 What is CRISPR-Cas9?
In 1987, researchers observed a pattern of short repeats of DNA sequences with non
repetitive “spacers” between these sequences in the genome of E. Coli bacteria
(Ishino, Krupovic and Forterre, 2018). These were named CRISPR (Clustered
regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats). It wasn’t until 2007 that the
function of CRISPR in nature was discovered. CRISPR acts as a sort of homing
device that guides a particular enzyme (Cas9) to a specific section of a DNA
sequence. The Cas9 enzyme acts like a pair of molecular scissors to cut a strand of
DNA, interrupting its sequence. Together, CRISPR and Cas9 work to modify the
genes in a cell by disabling or repairing genes in the places where Cas9 has made the
cuts. When observed in E. coli, CRISPR-Cas 9 allowed the bacteria to record
segments of viral DNA they came into contact with in their own genome. The
genome of a virus contains the genetic material necessary for the virus to continue
replicating. When that virus re-attacked, the bacteria could recognize the DNA
sequence within the genome and cut out viral strands of DNA, preventing the virus
from replicating and destroying the bacterial cell. The CRISPR function, therefore, is
a vital component of the bacterial immune system in the fight against viruses.
Several years after this exciting discovery in nature, scientists began developing
CRISPR-Cas9 as a simple yet powerful tool for editing genomes across a variety of
organisms (Caplan, et.al, 2015).
1.2 How Does CRISPR-Cas9 Work?
On each strand of DNA is a series of coded sequences that collectively make up the
genome of an organism. Specific codes (genotypes) inform the genetic expression or
characteristic traits of an organism (phenotype) (Caplan, et.al, 2015).
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The process of CRISPR-Cas9 was first observed in bacteria over three main stages
(see figure 1 below): First, in the adaptation phase, viral DNA is cut into short
segments to be inserted into the CRISPR sequence. This changes the original DNA
sequence. Second, in the processing stage, the CRISPR repeats are copied from
DNA to a RNA (Ribonucleic acid) chain, each carrying a part of the next repeat
sequence. This RNA chain is cut into short pieces called CRISPR RNAs. This RNA
then guides molecular material to the DNA target. Once it reaches its target, it can
turn off, knock out or change the sequence of the gene in the interference stage. This
is akin to deleting or editing words when writing a document.
There is a built-in safety mechanism, which ensures that Cas9 doesn't just cut
anywhere in a genome. Short DNA sequences known as PAMs (Protospacer Adjacent
Motifs) serve as tags and are positioned alongside the target DNA sequence. If the
Cas9 complex doesn't detect a PAM, it won't cut (Alkhnbashi, et.al,  2014).
Figure 1: The Three Major Phases of CRISPR
The specificity of The CRISPR-Cas9 immunity system to recognise and destroy
viruses that would attack a bacterial cell is not just useful for bacteria. Instead of
relying on bacteria to produce CRISPR RNAs, scientists are now able to design and
synthesize RNA molecules to match a particular DNA sequence so they can direct
this process artificially.
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In 2012, researchers were able to reprogram Cas9 to target specific genetic sites by
creating a single synthetic guide for making cuts to specific sites on a genome. This
made CRISPR into a simple tool for use in the lab (Jinek et.al, 2012).
In 2013, Feng Zhang was the first scientist to successfully adapt CRISPR-Cas9 for
genome editing in eukaryotic cells, the kinds of cells present in humans, which have
a nucleus that is enclosed within membranes, (Cong et al., 2013). This research was
done using eukaryotic cells of humans and mice. Their study also showed that
CRISPR could be programmed to target multiple locations on the genome (Cong et
al., 2013).
Creative applications of this CRISPR defense system are now being applied in a
variety of fields including agriculture, food production, research and medicine
(Mulvihill, et.al., 2017). Although gene editing is not necessarily a brand new idea in
itself, it is worth exploring how CRISPR may be different to some previously
developed gene editing methods. The next section will briefly examine the two main
ways in which gene editing can be done and then give a short comparison of these
methods with the CRISPR system.
1.3 Types of Gene Editing
Gene editing can be done in two ways, affecting the organism differently. One way is
somatic, meaning the changes affect the organism only and not any subsequent
generations. Through this process, cells are removed, edited, and reinstated into the
organism. This method could be used effectively for editing genes within a person to
treat diseases such as sickle cell anemia and some cancers (Ormond, et.al, 2017).
The second way gene editing is done is through germline editing. This is where
changes are made in the reproductive cells of a person. These changes will therefore
affect future generations. This method offers hope for the eradication of serious
heritable diseases within an individual and for all their descendants. Germline
editing is currently not fully developed for widespread use in humans just yet but it
is imminent (Ormond, et.al., 2017).
Somatic gene editing is somewhat less controversial, because its effects are confined
to the individual. However it does carry its own set of ethical dilemmas when
determining which attributes of a person are ‘disorders’ to be treated or merely
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‘enhancements’ of an otherwise healthy individual. The issue of somatic
enhancement eugenics is significant. Germline editing is however a more significant
and therefore more contentious ethical matter due to the lasting effects on
generations to come. These issues will be expanded upon in the following chapter.
1.4 Gene Editing Methods: A Brief Comparison of ZFN, TALEN and CRISPR-Cas9
To date, there are three main techniques that have been developed for genome
editing based on synthetic nucleases and transcription factors, namely, zinc finger
nuclease (ZFN), transcription activator-like effector nuclease (TALEN), and
CRISPR, (Gaj, Gersbach & Barbas, 2013).
ZFN and TALEN consist of programmable, sequence-specific DNA-binding modules
that enable a broad range of modifications to be introduced using a process of
double DNA strand breaks that trigger repairs to genomes at specific locations.
ZFN are artificially engineered chains of zinc proteins with an enzyme called FOK1
attached to the end of that chain. ZFN recognise and bind to specific triplets of DNA
code sequences. The FOK1 enzyme is derived from bacteria and acts as an
endonuclease, meaning it cuts the DNA at certain recognised sequences. When the
ZFN is positioned on both strands of the DNA, the FOK1 molecules form a dimer, a
chemical compound made of two smaller identical or similar molecules (monomers)
that are linked together. This dimer formation activates the enzyme and the section
of DNA is cut, creating a double strand break. The places where these double strand
breaks occur on the DNA strands is where editing of the genome can occur, either by
cutting out sections altogether or introducing new sequences. However, difficulties
in synthesising the ZFN commercially makes it expensive for large scale use (Gaj,
Gersbach & Barbas, 2013).
TALEN was discovered in bacteria that infect some plants. Much like the protein
chains in ZFNs, this involves FOK1 attached to the end of protein chains, this time
called TAL effectors. The TAL Effectors bind to DNA in a similar way to ZFN’s,
however the TAL Effectors bind to individual nucleotides in a DNA sequence rather
than triplets. The partner molecules bind to the other strand and the attached FOK1
enzymes cut the strands, creating a double strand break across the DNA. By
recognising and binding to single nucleotides rather than triplets, the interactions
between TALEN-derived DNA binding domains and their targets are less complex
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and more user friendly than ZFN. However, the major challenge for TALEN is to
clone the large modules in a series and join these modules in a designed order
efficiently (Gaj, et.al, 2013).
1.5 How Does CRISPR Compare?
The CRISPR-Cas system offers several advantages over the ZFN and TALEN
systems. Most importantly, CRISPR technology is very simple, easy to use and cheap
in comparison. Previously, the tools used in gene editing were expensive and
imperfect, so repeated trials were difficult to carry out. With CRISPR, scientists are
able to harness and control a naturally occurring process. What would cost many
thousands of dollars by other methods can be done for only a few hundred dollars
(Cui, Xu, Cheng, Liao & Peng, 2018). This has allowed scientists to carry out
multiple experiments at low cost.
However, as advantageous as the technology is, it has its own challenges.
Theoretically, the CRISPR-Cas system is highly specific. When applied practically
however, it is not immune to ‘off-target’ effects. These are random mutations that
can influence other areas of the genome. Off-target effects can be mitigated by using
Cas9 nickase, a modified version of Cas9 which creates a smaller nick in just one
DNA strand as opposed to a double strand break (Zhang, Tee, Wang, Huang & Yang,
2015). The presence of these off target effects however means that total confidence
in the effectiveness of CRISPR is not currently possible, so results need to be
carefully and critically evaluated and tested.
Despite these difficulties, ZNFs, TALENs and especially the CRISPR-Cas systems are
powerful tools for manipulating genomes. It is likely the refinements of these
systems will continue and that they will be adapted in new ways. Experimental
therapies that use ZFNs and TALENs continue to advance (Mullin, 2019). In the
short term, there remain safety concerns around CRISPR, in particular with regard
to off target effects. Older gene editing platforms are still being used until these
concerns are allayed, but their fate remains to be seen.
1.6 Uses for CRISPR
Scientists have learned how to harness CRISPR technology for use beyond
applications that involve bacterial immune defenses. It is now possible to make
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precise changes in the genes of plants, animals and humans. If a particular genomic
sequence on a strand of DNA is to produce a phenotypic expression that is harmful
or undesirable, then CRISPR can be used as a tool to edit this sequence out of the
DNA chain or insert new gene sequences altogether (Caplan, et.al, 2015). Because
genes are defined by their specific sequences, they provide instructions on how to
produce and maintain cells. Any change occurring in the sequence of even one gene
can have a dramatic impact on the biology of the cell and the overall functioning of
the organism.
The low cost and relative ease of use of CRISPR in gene editing particularly has
opened up numerous possibilities for the future of life as we know it. Some major
breakthroughs are already being discovered and developed through this simple yet
powerful system. Currently, there are step by step instructions available online for
anyone starting out with gene editing experiments of their own (Synthego, 2020).
Furthermore, for around USD$180, a person can purchase a CRISPR starter kit and
begin conducting experiments with editing bacteria at home (The Odin, 2020). This
shows how CRISPR has broken barriers of cost and ease of use to become a tool in
the hands of people outside of the laboratory setting, therefore expediting
discussions around ethical regulation.
In this thesis, I will focus on the uses of CRISPR in humans, discussing the benefits
and risks in terms of treatment of disease and enhancement of genetic expression in
individuals. However, I briefly acknowledge that CRISPR will have wide reaching
uses and effects outside of humans. Within the food and agriculture industry, there
are experiments being conducted using CRISPR to engineer livestock that carry
greater muscle mass for increased meat production and for modified crops resistant
to disease, pests and a changing climate (Royal Society of New Zealand, 2020).
CRISPR even allows for the manipulation of organisms to suit consumer preference.
For example, flowers producing a wider variety of colours, or food with enhanced or
modified flavors that appeal to consumers are all possibilities being explored
through CRISPR. It is true that for thousands of years, humans have engaged in gene
selection, through the careful breeding of certain crops and animals to eventually
produce a form of controlled varieties. However, the process that once took many
years can now be done within a single generation of an organism's life and carry a
lasting effect (Royal Society of New Zealand, 2020).
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1.6.1 CRISPR In The Lab
For laboratory research purposes, CRISPR has become an important tool in creating
animal models with specific genetic changes and observing the progress and
treatment of certain human diseases within these animals. For example, a study by
Buchthal, Lunshof, Esvelt, Evans & Telford (2018) used CRISPR to genetically
modify mice in order to develop immunity to tick borne diseases such as Lyme
disease. Mice are known to be prolific carriers of ticks, so making them immune to
the effects of tick bites is bringing hope towards a breakthrough in developing a
similar immune response in humans.
A further study by Kyrou, et.al (2018) used CRISPR to suppress the population of a
certain species of mosquitoes that carry malaria, thereby limiting the spread of the
disease to humans. Their research showed that they could use a ‘gene drive’ to
suppress a certain gene in these mosquitoes in Sub-Saharan Africa. A gene drive is a
genetic system that gives certain genes vastly increased probability to be reproduced
as a dominant expression throughout multiple generations. For example, during
natural gene selection in sexual reproduction, offspring inherit two versions of every
gene, one from each parent. Each parent carries two versions of the gene as well, so a
particular variant of any gene that is passed on is determined by chance. However,
‘gene drives’ subvert this random allocation to ensure that the genetic modification
will almost always be passed on, allowing that variant to spread rapidly through a
population (Kyrou et. al., 2018). The gene drive in this case prohibited the female of
the species from biting or laying eggs. When developed in this species of mosquitoes,
after eight generations there were no unmodified mosquitoes left to reproduce and
the population was extinguished.
1.6.2 In Medicine
CRISPR can be used for treatment of infectious diseases resistant to many forms of
common antibiotic medicines. Widespread prescriptions of antibiotics have led to a
rising prevalence of antibiotic resistance in humans and contribute to the current
health crisis associated with the subsequent rise in drug resistant bacteria. Multiple
copies of DNA carrying antibiotic-resistant genes can exist in each cell and can
transfer antibiotic resistance between bacteria, inhibiting the ability to successfully
treat a bacterial infection. Threats from antibiotic resistance could drastically
increase drug-resistant disease deaths (Valderrama, Kulkarni, Nizet, & Bier, 2019).
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In their study working with E. coli bacteria, Valderrama (et.al., 2019), developed a
method (called Pro-AG), to disrupt the function of a bacterial gene that causes
antibiotic resistance. Pro-AG effectively scrubs away the feature of the gene that
passes on drug resistance.
Furthermore, there has been increased attention to how CRISPR can be used in the
treatment of genetic diseases. In June 2017, a major breakthrough was discovered in
the potential treatment of Huntington’s disease, a fatal genetic disorder that causes
degenerative nerve damage to the brain. The study showed that the disease was
reversed in lab mice that had been engineered through CRISPR to have a human
mutant Huntingting gene in place of a mouse Huntingting gene (Yang, Yang, Huang,
Tang, & Guo, 2017). Researchers were able to snip out the part of the mutated gene
known to produce the devastating expression of Huntington’s disease.
In fact, CRISPR has already been trialled in humans. Researchers are using CRISPR
as a technique for treating people with cancer (Salas-Mckee, et.al, 2019). The goal is
to use CRISPR to assist a person's own immune system to attack cancer cells. The
approach is similar to another more commonly used therapy called CAR T cell
therapy, which engineers patients’ own immune cells to fight their cancer, but with
some key differences. As in CAR T, researchers collect a patient’s T cells through a
blood draw. T cells are cells produced in the bone marrow and are instrumental in
the body's immune response to disease, including viral infections and cancers.
However, instead of arming these cells with a receptor to assist in the attack against
cancer cells, the researchers use CRISPR editing to remove three genes. The first two
edits remove a T cell’s natural receptors to make sure the immune cells bind to the
right part of the cancer cells. The third edit removes PD-1, which is a natural
checkpoint that sometimes prevents T cells from responding to the threat. Then, an
affinity-enhanced T cell receptor is inserted which gives the edited T-cells a message
to target a specific antigen, binding it to the cancer cells to destroy them. Results
show that the edited T-cells bound to the cancer targets with no apparent serious
side effects. These early results indicate that the procedure may be safe and feasible
for wider use.
Founder and chairman of Parker Institute for Cancer Immunotherapy (PICI), Sean
Parker stated,
“Our purpose is to make sure [...] investigators have the support they need to
bring bold ideas like this to life. These early findings are the first step as we
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determine if this new, breakthrough technology can help rewrite how we
treat patients with cancer and perhaps other deadly diseases. CRISPR editing
could be the next generation of T cell therapy, and we are proud to be a part
of the first human trial in the United States.” (Penn Medicine News, 2019)
However, small sample sizes and the scope of the experiments show that there is
much more research to be done to determine whether using CRISPR is truly a safe
approach on a broader scale.
1.6.3 Challenges Ahead
These are just a few examples of the myriad of ways CRISPR is being used. The
simplicity of CRISPR opens possibilities for gene editing for a large variety of
purposes and across multiple industries and scientific fields. Whether it's in the
treatment of disease in humans or addressing food shortages, what is clear is the
level of excitement around future possibilities for human life and across multiple
industries. However, this brings forth the question of how we can ensure that these
“bold ideas” can be pursued while ensuring the safety and ethical integrity of
widespread CRISPR use.
It is clear that since the advent of CRISPR, there is renewed vigor for developing the
tremendous potential of gene editing for producing life saving treatments. However,
the pace at which such technology is developing is outstripping the pace of
regulatory policies on gene editing. Without adequate policy concerning the ethical
issues of such practices, there are potentially harmful consequences for humanity,
including the spectre of eugenics and all of the issues this raises.
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Chapter 2 - Ethical Challenges
In this chapter, I will outline some of the ethical challenges that are tied to the
application of gene editing technologies generally. Beginning with a discussion of a
common underlying philosophical debate at play within bioethics, I will go on to
explore some of the unique challenges that CRISPR presents. Finally, I will explore
some of the global responses to handling these challenges and investigate Aotearoa
New Zealand's current position on gene editing applications.
The ethical issues surrounding gene editing, particularly germline editing are not
new. There has been an ongoing debate about how we should use gene therapy,
especially in humans, if at all. Much of this is due to the ongoing difficulty amongst
the scientific, governmental and even religious communities to definitively clarify
the line between treating human ailments and enhancing human life for
non-medical reasons. However, a more fundamental question goes deeper than that.
The emergence of such user-friendly gene editing technology in CRISPR runs us
directly up against our previously held notions of what it means to be a human and
have a flourishing, healthy life. In a few short decades, researchers have moved away
from money and labour intensive experiments in the lab, to relatively cheap, fast
gene editing. Human genetics was previously considered a matter of pure chance,
with nature firmly in the driver's seat regarding how we appear and exist on this
planet. The power to determine human genetic makeup has now shifted closer to
being within our control. With such newfound dominion over our DNA code, it is
imperative we ask these fundamental questions around human flourishing to ensure
that we use it ethically.
To understand the more practical issues surrounding gene editing, it is necessary to
look at the underlying belief systems that inform debate and decisions on gene
editing. One of the ways to approach the issue of human enhancement involves two
opposing philosophical approaches: Transhumanism and Bioconservatism. What
follows is a brief summary of the transhumanist and bioconservatism positions.
2.1 Transhumanism and Bioconservatism
Transhumanism is the belief that the human race can, and should evolve beyond its
current physical and mental limitations. The goal of improving and advancing the
human condition is thought to be brought about through the development and use of
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technology (Hayes, 2018). Sir Julian Huxley is regarded as a figurehead for
transhumanism, arguing that humans are not only able, but compelled to transcend
their own human nature and therefore realise new possibilities for the human race
(Huxley, 1968, p.76).
“It is as if man had been suddenly appointed managing director of the biggest
business of all, the business of evolution, appointed without being asked if he
wanted it, and without proper warning and preparation. What is more, he
can't refuse the job. Whether he wants to or not, whether he is conscious of
what he is doing or not, he is in point of fact determining the future direction
of evolution on this earth. That is his inescapable destiny, and the sooner he
realizes it and starts believing in it, the better for all concerned. What the job
really boils down to is this the fullest realization of man's possibilities,
whether by the individual, by the community, or by the species in its
processional adventure along the corridors of time.” (Huxley, 1968, p.73)
Transhumanism began to gain traction amongst intellectual circles in the 1980’s.
The movement became more official with philosophers Nick Bostrom and David
Pearce establishing the World Transhumanist Association (WTA), an international
non-governmental organization working toward the recognition of transhumanism
as a legitimate subject of scientific inquiry and public policy (Hayes, 2018).
It follows then that the Transhumanist is very much in favour of the use of gene
editing for both medical treatment and enhancement (Vallor, 2016, ch.10). The
transhumanist holds that decisions about what is a genuine ‘enhancement’ should be
left to private individuals rather than controlled by government or committees. This
argument is based on the claim that most individuals who wish to use gene editing
techniques will have good reasons to choose enhancement for themselves and their
children (Bostrom, 2005). This is an assertion of the idea that people would know
what is best for themselves, having thought carefully and clearly about such issues so
as not to perform genetic edits for frivolous reasons. The transhumanist rejects the
idea of a unified sense of flourishing and holds that humans will splinter and expand
into multiple versions of flourishing in the achievement of some, currently
unspecified end (Vallor, 2016, ch.10).
Vallor (2016) argues that the problem that transhumanists face is that despite a
passionate call for transcending the present human condition, there remains a lack
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of clarity on why transcending the human condition is preferable or necessary. There
seems to be no specific end goal, or indeed a knowledge of what exactly humans are
to wish for. After all, embracing technology freely with the aim of transcending our
human condition may not actually be conducive to human flourishing. Not all
growth and change is equal to flourishing; some change is destructive. Transcending
our humanity does not automatically equate with human improvement.
Conversely, bioconservatism in the human enhancement debate endorses the
conservative claim that we should reject the use of biotechnologies that enhance
natural human capacities, such as gene editing or artificial intelligence technologies
integrated with the human organism (Roache & Savulescu, 2016, ch.10).
Bioconservatives range in political perspective from right-leaning religious and
cultural conservatives to left-leaning environmentalists and technology critics. What
unifies bioconservatives is a deep skepticism about medical and other
biotechnological alterations of the natural world (Roache & Savulescu, 2016, ch.10).
Michael Sandel, an outspoken critic of gene editing argues strongly for a
bioconservatism stance by employing virtues such as humility, solidarity and
responsibility in defending his position against gene editing (Sandel, 2004). To the
bioconservatist, human enhancement technologies are thought to be
‘dehumanizing’. The worry is that these technologies might somehow undermine our
human dignity or inadvertently erode something that is deeply valuable about being
human (Bostrom, 2005).
This concern of biotechnology leading to ‘dehumanization’ is difficult to factor into a
quantifiable, cost-benefit analysis. It is possible to offer a vast number of
modifications to the human body, both for medical and aesthetic reasons, to which
most bioconservatism would offer little or no objection. Consider organ transplants,
or routine surgeries to remove or implant devices (such as pacemakers) to manage
or cure disease. It is tricky to definitively pinpoint exactly what aspect of
transhumanism presents a moral stumbling block sufficient to justify the
bioconservatist position. If the aim of the bioconservative is to preserve human
dignity, there are many areas where technology can be strongly argued to do just
that and indeed improve quality of life. If, for example, the bioconservatist is in
favour of the use of a pacemaker but against genetically removing the need for them,
this becomes a difficult position to justify. Without proper justification of what
exactly is dehumanizing about gene editing or other enhancement technologies then
for bioconservatism, this represents a challenge.
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Furthermore, some enhancements arguably do preserve human wellbeing. For
instance, perhaps we may develop technology that could enhance the natural senses
of those who are in positions of protection or national security so they can detect
danger more quickly and prevent large scale attacks. If this was done by some other
means such as a removable device worn on the body or even an implant, the
bioconservatism may not have an argument against this.
It seems that somewhere between these two stances lies the correct view. The
question we should be concerned about is where the compromise between these
extremes lies. It is my argument that a principled, yet flexible approach is required
to navigate this issue, one that can accommodate for the value-laden nature of such
broad, philosophical debates across an increasingly ambiguous moral landscape in
light of the rapid pace of technological development. I will now move to outline a
few of the significant, immediate ethical issues that have arisen over the last few
decades regarding gene editing more generally.
2.1.1 Technology
The first area of concern pertains to the power and limitations of the technology
itself as it is today, such as ‘off-target’ mutations and incomplete editing or
mosaicism (Wang & Wang, 2019). Off-target mutations refer to unintended genetic
modifications that can arise through the use of gene editing. Genetic mosaicism
refers to an incomplete edit or modification of an organism, leading to the organism
having multiple sets of cells with different genotypes.
Even once a gene has been successfully edited, there remains an incomplete
understanding of how it will interact with other genes and in phenotypic expression.
It may be possible to improve the accuracy for editing in a single gene, however,
many phenotypes involve multiple genes interacting in a number of complex ways.
Environmental factors also influence phenotypes, so researchers may be more
unsure about results in subjects once outside of the laboratory. To presume that
editing a specific gene will change a desired phenotype is to claim a full
understanding of all the interactions involved in the genetics of that case. This
understanding is far from complete. Although the risks and benefits of many such
therapies are increasingly better understood, questions regarding safety and efficacy
remain.
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2.1.2 Disease or Not?
Early suggestions that CRISPR could be instrumental in eradicating previously
untreatable diseases lends to the thought that this technology will be of immense
benefit to humanity. There are cases where intervention through gene editing would
clearly be beneficial, for example in the treatment of Huntington's disease or some
cancers. With a better understanding of gene editing techniques, less controversial
applications involving somatic gene editing for therapeutic purposes have significant
public support globally (Chritchley, et al., 2019). These applications include for
example, “editing the blood stem cells of patients who have a congenital blood
disease, metabolic disorder or immune deficiency, or improving the capacity of
immune cells to attack cancer cells.” (KNAW, 2016, p.2). Somatic gene editing
applications could therefore aid in developing treatment for genetic diseases such as
Sickle-Cell disease, Hemophilia B, Cystic Fibrosis, neurodegenerative diseases, some
cancers and viral infections like HIV (NASEM, 2017).
In that case, we might think that one easy rule is: it is permissible to treat diagnosed
diseases. However, once we push further, past these apparently morally ‘easy’ cases,
the ethical lines very quickly begin to blur. We run into questions of what counts as a
disease and what counts more as a way of being human in the world. In February
2017, a multidisciplinary committee of the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine published a comprehensive report on the use of gene
editing applications in humans. The Committee was in favour of somatic gene
editing for treatment of disease but did not make any provisions in favour of
enhancement, stating, “transparent and inclusive public policy debates should
precede any consideration of whether to authorize clinical trials of somatic cell
genome editing for indications that go beyond treatment or prevention of disease or
disability” (NASEM, 2017, p. 110).
It isn’t always clear when we move from talking about eradicating disease to talking
about the ‘correct’ way to be a human being. If people had the ability to edit the
human genome only a few generations ago, arguably there are some kinds of people
that may have been eradicated whom we now see as perfectly good ways to be
human in the world. Perhaps even making allowances for germline editing for
medical purposes raises the spectre of eugenics. How we as a society choose which
human features are pathologized and which are simply part of a diverse population
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will depend on our personal and collective values. It is worth acknowledging at this
point, that such a claim is controversial, as some philosophers deny that values are
an important consideration for attribution of disease (Boorse, 1975). However, even
such commentators will admit that determining which diseases are treated and
which are not does involve values. Boorse states that even to label something as a
‘disease’ is to place a value of condemnation on such a state (Boorse, 1975, p.50).
Values can vary significantly between cultures, within a culture, across time
(especially pertinent for germline editing) and regarding a wide range of human
features. If we are able to actually begin changing the DNA of our species according
to what we value as more or less desirable characteristics, it may signal a precarious
future for those who are not considered a desirable fit.
The distinction between what makes something a disease or an alternative way of
being human is sometimes complex. For example, editing out Huntington’s disease
might seem an easily acceptable use for gene editing, but considering eradicating
something like Trisomy 21 (Downs Syndrome) is much less clear cut. Deciding which
aspects of humanity are acceptable or useful in society carries a heavy burden of
value.
Second, there are issues around what is acceptable in terms of curing disease as
opposed to human enhancement. If enhancing intelligence for some and not others
causes moral discomfort, it is important to think about why. The issue with
enhancing someone’s intelligence may create an unfair advantage to some over
others. Perhaps enhancing someone’s intelligence would somehow alter a person’s
fundamental identity. Now, consider a case of ADHD (Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder). If someone was diagnosed with ADHD, currently classified
as a disorder, then surely there is a responsibility to ‘cure’ it if it became possible to
do this through CRISPR. However, in this case, the claim is that people should not
have short concentration spans (a way of being in the world). If there is doubt over
this claim, or even if it is completely wrong, then it is not ‘curing’ ADHD, but
‘enhancing’ humans to adopt a particular way of being in the world. In this way,
ADHD touches on both issues. First, there is the suggestion that people who have
trouble maintaining focussed attention are not human in the ‘correct way’. Second,
there is a question over whether increasing ability to maintain focus is a ‘cure’ or an
‘enhancement’.
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So, even if we just make the distinction that it is acceptable to only deal with disease
and not enhancements, it is imperative that we develop a well motivated framework
of what characteristics we classify as disease and what are enhancements. We know
that this is not always easy to deduce, which then presents a problem both for the
distinction itself and for the eugenics problem. Historically, there are examples of
terrible atrocities committed against humanity in the name of eugenics even without
such powerful technology, such as involuntary sterilization of groups considered to
be less acceptable in society (Koonz, 1992).
Current examples which are causing concern today include people living with
Trisomy 21 (Down Syndrome), Achondroplasia (Dwarfism) or deafness. Some
members of these communities have raised serious objections to some of the
potential uses for gene editing. It is important to note that Trisomy 21 is
chromosomal rather than due to a specific gene, so I acknowledge a slight disanalogy
in the context of gene editing specifically. The example of Trisomy 21 however is an
ongoing issue, and can be affected via selective termination following prenatal
screening tests. In Iceland for example, where a comprehensive screening program
is in place for expectant mothers, in 2004 and 2005 all fetuses identified with
Trisomy 21 were aborted (Gottfreðsdóttir & Björnsdóttir, 2010). This example
speaks to a precedent towards the eradication of certain lifeways. A study by
Tafazoli, Behjati, Fatrhud and Abbaszadegan (2019) shows that CRISPR could be
used to edit out certain genes that predispose those with Trisomy 21 to a higher risk
of certain traits, such as intellectual difficulties. Regarding a proposed treatment for
deafness, biologist Denis Rebrikov claims to be working with a deaf couple to
genetically modify embryos in order to produce a child that does not carry genes for
deafness (Cyranoski, 2019). Many members of such communities strongly oppose
the idea that they are disordered or diseased and carry grave concerns about how
gene editing and gene selection could narrow population diversity and eradicate
certain groups altogether (Mozersky, et al., 2017).
There are further ethical considerations in the area of public health. It is unclear
what, if any, interventions should be made in the interest of promoting the chance
of healthier lifestyles, in the absence of any disease at all. For instance, if a
gene-editing approach allowed for reduction in harmful cholesterol levels,
promoting healthier individuals with decreased chance of developing heart disease,
this could be considered an enhancement towards reducing the potential for
negative and costly health outcomes, even the prevention of premature death. We
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would need to examine if it would be right in performing such enhancements in the
name of such benefits, even if it meant removing the potential person’s possible
desire not to have genetically modified or enhanced genes. This scenario exemplifies
how increasingly contentious and difficult it is to determine whether cases like this
should be classified as an ‘enhancement’, or a necessary medical intervention in the
interest of public health.
There are two entangled issues here. The “disease issue” and the “right kind of
people issue”. There are decisions to be made regarding the kinds of people who will
be represented in future generations, and the distinction between what is helping
people with disease and what is enhancement according to an ideal version of being
human.
2.1.3 Social Concerns
There are wider socio-political issues around how gene editing can contribute to
inequality in terms of fair access to any decision-making processes or potential
benefits of the technology. An example of this is in the production of nutrient
enhanced crops and livestock. In 2018, The World Health Organization estimated
that 821 million or 1 in 9 people worldwide were undernourished and approximately
2 billion people were unable to obtain key nutrients like iron and Vitamin A (World
Health Organisation, 2018). If, through gene editing, people could fortify or improve
nutrient content in foods then decreasing malnutrition and increasing access to
higher quality foods is possible (Hebert, 2018, p. 510). If political relations are
strained between countries who have access to this technology and those who do not,
this could lead to increased power imbalances globally.
Returning to the issue of human enhancement however, there is moral weight in
considering if this technology will be ‘equal access’ or instead used, even
unintentionally, as a catalyst for increased global inequality. Globally, people are not
equally situated with regard to the benefits and harms of biomedicine and
biotechnology. Certain groups, or nations may be disproportionately affected
through the development of - and therefore the access to - benefits or
decision-making processes regarding gene editing technologies (Nuffield Council on
Bioethics, 2016, p. 29-30). Care needs to be taken to ensure that access to gene
editing technologies does not exacerbate existing social inequality at a genetic level.
Unfair distribution of such opportunities amongst various societal groups could
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become entrenched across generations. For example, an initial financial or political
advantage could be converted to a genetically enhanced population in terms of
enhanced physicality or IQ. Should this become generationally entrenched, the
social inequities that exist today could find new footing at a genetic level, creating a
kind of genetic class system.
A study by Brineger et.al (2017), focuses on the increased interest from private
companies in the commercialization of genome editing and patenting of certain
genetic modifications and techniques. This introduces another set of complex ethical
issues where genes become a commodity, possibly influencing socioeconomic
divisions and wealth disparities. This brings the issue of access to the fore. If, for
instance, research and development of the technology is government - and therefore
taxpayer funded, it can be argued that it is morally wrong to limit access to
potentially life saving benefits of such techniques to those who indirectly funded the
development of the technique. While this problem is not unique to this particular
situation, it may not be prudent to rely on a free market to provide equitable
healthcare.
2.2 Why is CRISPR Unique?
All of the aforementioned issues are recognised concerns regarding gene editing.
However, when these concerns arise regarding gene editing through CRISPR this
makes them especially urgent. The emergence of CRISPR represents a new
challenge. What makes CRISPR unique over other editing technologies is primarily
due to the ease of use, accessibility and affordability of the technique. The
development of CRISPR has therefore advanced the progress of gene editing at a
rapid pace and it is now at the forefront of gene editing applications. CRISPR has
brought the established ethical issues around gene editing into sharp relief,
requiring urgent attention. The task of working through the uncomfortable
relationship between ethics and science is of paramount importance. It is vital that
the scientific and philosophical communities become accustomed to working
collaboratively to manage the exciting and worrying aspects of CRISPR.
For gene editing through newer technologies such as CRISPR, a common concern
amongst the literature is a lack of clear, unified systems to inform policy. Mulvihill
et al., (2017, p.19), state that current ethical guidelines around genetic modification
are not equipped to meet the ethical demands of gene editing through the CRISPR
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method in particular. Whilst the article does not identify any new ethical issues of
gene editing using CRISPR compared with existing gene therapy or genetic
engineering technology generally speaking, it notes that the sheer speed of new
findings using CRISPR does accelerate the need for further research into the
management of such issues (Mulvihill, et al., 2017, p. 19). The article maintains a
particular focus on the principle of solidarity in gene editing research practices as
the pathway forward towards ensuring the public good (Mulvihill, et al., 2017, p. 24).
It is notable that the philosophical approach in this article situates gene editing
through CRISPR as a question of value or virtues, rather than weighing up the
consequences that may eventuate from this technology.
Similarly, Caplan et.al, (2015) discuss an urgent need for effective, global regulations
that govern the testing and environmental release of Genetically Modified
Organisms (GMOs). The speed, low cost and ease of use of CRISPR motivates the
need for robust regulations on gene editing in all organisms (Caplan, et al., 2015, p.
1421).
Crucially, the speed at which CRISPR is being developed and utilised makes it
difficult to predict and stay ahead of the myriad of specific ethical dilemmas which
may come to light. This is problematic when attempting to create robust regulations
around its use. Regulations governing gene therapy research may facilitate the safe
development and oversight of some clinical trials involving CRISPR based editing
applications. However, where such ethical awareness and monitoring are lacking,
safety and privacy risks are likely to increase. Cheaper and easier access may mean
that applications become available within months of concept, rather than years. The
standard processes of ethically vetting such procedures are therefore out of step with
these possibilities because formulating new policies or making the changes required
to existing policies will likely be too slow in coming when compared with the
developmental pace of gene editing technology. This is a particular concern when
considering the potential for CRISPR to be utilised outside of the controlled
laboratory setting, with the availability of CRISPR kits for private sale online, as
previously mentioned. In fact, there is a movement that campaigns for this
specifically, opening up arguments around access.
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2.2.1 The Politics of Access
One way to avoid CRISPR’s ethical issues might be to demand that its development
is slowed down and heavily restricted. However, this may not be the right thing to
do, especially when considering the potential for treatment of disease. Some argue
that because CRISPR is relatively easy, cheap and accessible, it should remain that
way for the general public, rather than being captured and controlled by the
government or private enterprises only. As this technology stems from a discovery in
nature, there is an argument for the free and unfettered access to all who wish to use
it. Former NASA biochemist Josiah Zayner is an outspoken advocate for such an
approach. His CRISPR kits for sale online have caused a controversy amongst the
scientific community and warnings from the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) that selling gene therapy products without their approval is
illegal (Ireland, 2017).
Zayner has become a major figure in the “biohacker'' movement, a collective of
artists, designers, scientists and engineers who believe that gene therapy products
such as CRISPR should remain in the public domain. His belief is that humans
pursue ideals of autonomy and equality. It is these ideals that fundamentally drive a
desire to control one's own genetic profile and expression. Zayner asserts that
humans should be educated on how to use CRISPR for themselves and empowered
to treat themselves with gene therapy as medicine. In a move demonstrating his
beliefs, Zyane became the first person to inject himself with CRISPR modified DNA
designed to increase muscle mass whilst being filmed during a talk he was giving on
CRISPR uses and accessibility. In a 2017 interview with The Guardian, Zayner stated
that treatment of disease or enhancement at a genetic level should be considered the
ultimate medicine (Ireland, 2017). Whilst Zayner makes a valid point relating to the
benefits of cheaper and easier access to CRISPR for medical treatment, it does
highlight the difficulties of CRISPR being effective in the hands of people who may
knowingly or even accidentally, through untrained, underregulated actions, usher in
some of the more harmful effects of gene editing.
This example shows how CRISPR technology has rapidly become a contentious issue
embedded in social, economic and political spheres. CRISPR therefore requires a
well considered, robust, ethical response,  both globally and locally.
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2.3 The Need for a Philosophical Response
Philosopher Shannon Vallor asserts that there is a vital connection between
developing technology and ethics. She argues that the relationship between the two
need to be a point of focus in order to seek and secure human flourishing, “Ethics
and technology are connected because technologies invite [...] specific patterns of
thought, behaviour and valuing; they open up new possibilities for human action
and foreclose or obscure others.” (Vallor, 2016, p.3). Vallor further explains how
technology has advanced so much in recent decades, that it has the ability to affect a
far wider proportion of the population, including future generations. Therefore, a
contemporary theory of ethics, one that holds to an account of a good life, that
guides us on how to live well with emerging technologies is required (Vallor, 2016,
p.6).
Through CRISPR, it is now easier and more affordable to achieve greater control
over our own DNA, something that until now was only left to chance and accepted as
immovable. We worked around our genetic code as best we could. Now, our DNA
can be seen as a potential barrier, a genetic ‘glass ceiling’ to break through with a few
simple techniques. This leads to the question of how we are to learn to live well with
technology that allows us far more possibility for change than ever before.
2.4 Global Response to CRISPR:
Therapeutic applications of gene therapy through CRISPR are on the increase, as the
delivery of the technology becomes safer and more accurate (Cheng & Tsai, 2018).
Presently, anticipation is building around such experimentation in The United States
of America. In early 2018, for example, the US National Institutes of Health
launched the Somatic Cell Genome Editing program. The program aims to improve
the delivery mechanisms for targeting gene editing tools in patients, develop
improved genome editors, implement safety testing of the genome editing tools in
animal and human cells and create a genome editing toolkit containing the resulting
insights for sharing within the scientific community (SCGE, 2018). Heritable
genome editing, however, remains the CRISPR systems' most controversial
application.
24
Since the advent of CRISPR applications, many professional, scientific and medical
groups have formulated a response to the ethical challenges of CRISPR and how it
should be used in gene editing, if at all. Most statements pertaining to the use of
CRISPR concur that for the time being, heritable germline experimentation should
be prohibited, although reports from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Spain,
and the United States of America suggest that this could become permissible if a
number of conditions can be satisfied. For example, The NASEM Committee's report
specified a framework in which germline editing may be used:
“The absence of reasonable alternatives; restriction to preventing a serious
disease or condition; restriction to editing genes that have been convincingly
demonstrated to cause or to strongly predispose to that disease or condition;
restriction to converting such genes to versions that are prevalent in the
population and are known to be associated with ordinary health with little or
no evidence of adverse effects; the availability of credible preclinical and/or
clinical data on risks and potential health benefits of the procedures;
ongoing, rigorous oversight during clinical trials of the effects of the
procedure on the health and safety of the research participants;
comprehensive plans for longterm, multigenerational follow up that still
respect personal autonomy; maximum transparency consistent with patient
privacy; continued reassessment of both health and societal benefits and
risks, with broad ongoing participation and input by the public; and reliable
oversight mechanisms to prevent extension to uses other than preventing a
serious disease or condition” (NASEM, 2017, p. 134-35)
This shows that serious misgivings remain regarding gene editing and there is room
for further research and debate regarding the ethical challenges before even
beginning to formulate robust policy around its use.
2.4.1 The Local Context
The broad range of potential applications of CRISPR could reignite ethical debates
generated by earlier forms of genetic modification in Aotearoa New Zealand. Prior to
CRISPR, early applications of gene editing technologies to create transgenic
organisms stirred significant public concern, leading to the establishment of a Royal
Commission of Inquiry into Genetic Modification in 2001. Based on over 10000
public submissions, the Commission developed its report which informed the
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current stance that the growing of genetically modified crops is prohibited (Royal
Commission on Genetic Modification, 2001). Subsequently, there has been a
substantial push towards relaxing these rules on environmental and economic
grounds (Morton, 2019). When considering gene editing for therapeutic and
research purposes in humans, the Human Assisted Reproductive Act (2004)
contains legislation pertaining to these practices.
Since the establishment of the Act, there has been no formal update of policy on
gene technologies in Aotearoa New Zealand (Royal Society Te Aparangi, 2019). This
is significant, given that CRISPR was developed for practical use in the laboratory in
2012. So, in spite of the significant difference between CRISPR and the technologies
for which this policy was developed, there has been no formal response since its
arrival. This shows that Aoteara New Zealand urgently needs to officially form a
revised response around its policy on gene editing, taking CRISPR into account. It is
imperative that Aotearoa New Zealand weighs in on this debate and forms an
approach that is suited to our unique cultural perspective, whilst still staying abreast
of global developments and trends in gene editing.
The Royal Society of New Zealand (RSNZ) Gene Editing Panel aims to engage the
public in discussions and provide advice to the New Zealand Government on
potential options for regulation (Royal Society of New Zealand, 2016; 2017). Gene
editing is currently considered genetic modification, meaning non-human
gene-edited organisms are classified as “new organisms” and are thus subject to
approval processes under the Environmental Protection Authority, a process which
includes the incorporation of Māori perspectives (Hudsen et.al, 2019).
In recent years, the RSNZ panel has considered the implications of technologies
such as CRISPR, concluding that an overhaul of current regulations is due and that
there is a need for nationwide discussion on how to proceed for the future. The panel
discussed the use of gene editing in areas of healthcare, environment, pest
management and primary industries. These discussions identified a number of
potential issues, including that the legal framework is becoming increasingly out of
date given the global advances in gene editing technology. Expert panel Co-chair Dr
David Penman said that there is a need to move on from a black and white view of
gene editing, towards a more nuanced view that recognises a wide range of
applications of the technology, some of which may be more, or less acceptable to
various communities than others. It is therefore important that Aotearoa New
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Zealand forms its own views on the ethics of gene editing, given its unique cultural
heritage and environment, including the unique challenges faced in maintaining
biodiversity and a productive economy (Royal Society Te Aparangi, 2019) .
Because the focus of this project remains on ethical considerations for gene editing
applications in humans, the following excerpts are from the panel's review of some
of the key concerns as they pertain to use in this area. They describe the current
values that underpin their recommendations.
On healthcare:
“Gene editing of tissue to treat severe diseases controlled by a single gene is
currently achievable and can be ethically acceptable if the treatment provides
significant benefits to those for whom alternative therapies are limited, and if
it has a reasonable prospect of being safe and effective, provided that patients
are fully informed, and new treatments are subject to rigorous scientific and
ethical review[….] For Māori whānau, that decision may align, or be in direct
conflict with, Māori values and aspirations for flourishing whakapapa into
the future. The benefits of the procedure should outweigh the risks, and there
should be direct benefits for participants and their communities from a Te Ao
Māori perspective.” (Royal Society Te Aparangi, 2019, p.5-6)
On germline editing for medical purposes there is a clear concern for what we owe to
future generations, from a moral perspective. The panel acknowledges the issue of
having autonomy and ownership over one’s body but recognises the tension between
the desire to make decisions on behalf of those who cannot give consent, such as
embryos.
“This raises issues regarding ‘intergenerational justice’, or what we owe
future generations [….] Where Māori embryos are concerned, it will be
fundamental that culturally appropriate ethical processes that ensure the key
values of whakapapa, tika, manaakitanga, and mana are upheld […] It would
be useful to consider the benefits of the procedure and whether those
outweigh the risks. There should also be direct benefits for the participants
and their communities.” (Royal Society Te Aparangi, 2019, p.9)
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On physical enhancement:
“Whilst deleting particular genes can moderate disease properties, it is
possible that similar, naturally-arising genomic events could confer desirable
characteristics [...] without a medical purpose [...] In a Māori context, careful
consideration should be given to the pūtake, the purpose of the procedure,
and decisions taken in full consideration of culturally appropriate ethical
processes that uphold the key values of whakapapa, tika, manaakitanga, and
mana. Any benefits should outweigh the risks, and the outcome should
benefit the Māori community.” (Royal Society Te Aparangi, 2019, p.11)
The Panel highlights the need for a thorough evaluation of the purpose of any
enhancements but does not necessarily rule them out as an option for the future.
There remains however a strong cautionary tone in the recommendations grounded
in having solid reasons for the enhancement, indicating a wariness towards a
slippery slope of enhancement procedures that could become problematic in future.
They have identified key ethical concerns around gene editing and in particular,
have emphasised the need for an urgent review of current policy. They indicated a
need for a principled approach based on values that situate us globally whilst being
careful to reflect our specific cultural values.
“The Panel would like to see a legal and regulatory system in New Zealand
that is more future-proofed and ‘fit-for-purpose’ by being easier to navigate,
having clear and consistent definitions, and providing a better basis for
assessing the risks and opportunities of particular applications of gene
editing” (Royal Society Te Aparangi, 2019).
This is a clear indication of the position of the Royal Society and what I aim to clarify
and build upon throughout the rest of this project. The panel has made good
progress in highlighting the need for a principled approach. However, there are
some areas where these recommendations should be challenged on a fundamental
basis to move to an effective implementation stage.
The recommendations uncover a number of issues. First, the move to say that gene
editing is acceptable as long as it is safe and the benefits outweigh negative side
effects is almost trivially true. The real work is to figure out how to assess these
benefits and risks. Calculating any adverse side effects however remains difficult,
particularly when attempting to carry out a risk assessment that extends
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intergenerationally. Furthermore, there is debate surrounding whether we have a
right to manipulate the genetics of future generations, and if so, the extent of our
obligation to calculate the chance of doing harm to those generations that do not yet
exist.
The second assertion that it should be accepted if it improves wellbeing, whilst not
trivially true, it is close to it. There is no definitive, clear explanation of what
“wellbeing” means. The panel does state that Māori perspectives and values should
be upheld, but also states that sometimes the decisions made in gene editing will fly
in the face of such values. Furthermore, the recommendations state that any editing
applications in Māori embryos should benefit Māori communities, but do not make
any suggestion as to what form these benefits could take.
Finally, the recommendations do not adequately distinguish between a cure and an
enhancement towards wellbeing. The concepts of ‘cure’ and ‘enhancement’ relate to
what we think a human life should be like and any decisions regarding gene editing
applications will likely be dictated by values, which are inherently not objective. It
appears that the panel is attempting to use a framework involving consequentialist
calculations of utility alongside the recognition of certain cultural values, without
adequately specifying how these approaches can be applied or how they might work
together. Making decisions based on values and calculating utility are two distinctive
approaches that have different aims. One concerns upholding a principle of living
and the other concerns upholding maximum utility. Whilst it may be true that in
certain circumstances, upholding certain values will lead to maximum utility, this is
not always the case. Therefore, framing discussions combining these two methods
will at least require substantial clarification. It is therefore not yet clear how
incorporating this approach could be effective informing robust policy around gene
editing.
In my view, the unique and rapid development of gene editing applications through
CRISPR should move us to carefully consider the deeper ethical commitments and
our values as a society to guide our thinking on the subject. A focus on predicting
and calculating the risks and benefits is secondary to these deeper commitments.
Creating policy based on a framework of these values and ethical commitments
should form the basis of any practical measures on CRISPR use.
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The panel has certainly highlighted the need for robust policy around the use of
modern gene editing technologies like CRISPR. Questions remain as to whether
there is a suitable ethical and philosophical framework that is capable of
underpinning this work and can inform our approach to these ethical challenges that
will shape biological life as we know it. Despite all the familiarity of a cost benefit
framework, it may be time to rethink.
2.5 Next steps: A Philosophical Approach
The increased affordability and ease of access to fundamentally alter life as we know
it through CRISPR, for generations to come, calls for an ethical approach that is
robust, yet flexible enough to meet these rapidly developing challenges, both globally
and in Aotearoa New Zealand.
Despite the clear and legitimate concerns, there is little doubt that CRISPR has
become a valuable tool in research. Jennifer Doudner, a pioneer in the development
of CRISPR has stated that her most pressing concern regarding the use of CRISPR
centers around the misuse of the technology in such a way that it causes the general
public to distrust and therefore disregard its incredible potential to help humanity in
the fight against disease (Kuchler, 2020). Given the significant promise in terms of
benefits and the potential for misuse, the global community must begin the work of
revising outdated laws and recommendations, turning its hand to creating an
ethically sound decision-making framework that is fit for dealing with the complex
cases that CRISPR will likely bring.
The issue now centres around appropriate ethical management of developing
technologies. It is necessary to discuss whether it is possible to create a set of fixed
rules around gene editing or if a more flexible approach, one in keeping with the
pace of technological change is required.
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2.5.1 Ethics in Aotearoa New Zealand
In examining the RSNZ Panels response to gene editing, it is important to clarify
whether utility calculations or rules are the dominant ethical framework or whether
a combination of normative ethics frameworks are in play. Identifying the
underlying theory is important so that there is a clear value system to rely on when
particularly difficult cases arise. One particularly interesting feature in studying the
excerpts from the Panel is that there is a view towards incorporating core principles
of Tikanga but within a cost-benefit framework. ‘Tikanga’ can refer to the nature or
function of something (Aotea Made, 2020). It isn't clear that a cost-benefit
framework adequately accommodates the kind of nuanced and deep discussion
required of applying principles of Tikanga because not everything that constitutes
the nature of something can be understood in measurable terms that allow for a
complete cost-benefit analysis. It may be the case that reimagining the kind of
philosophical framework from which we approach these principles is more effective.
Perhaps the kind of philosophical framework that holds principles of Tikanga and
how these principles interact with one another at its core could better accommodate
the kinds of challenges we face in applying CRISPR in humans.
Perrett and Paterson (1991), have discussed traditional New Zealand Māori ethics as
being a values-based perspective. The authors show how Māori ethics is not centered
on explicit rules for action but follows the ancestors, who are the model to the
kinship group. And it is here that a key concept of Māori ethics, the concept of tika
(naturalism), comes into play (Perrett & Patterson, 1991, p.187). In humans, this
includes appearance, mannerisms, cultural practices and most importantly the inner
character or life force that manifests itself through these expressions. The
all-important quality here is that of being in accord with human nature, being
"natural" and hence reasonable and correct. For Māori this means being in
accordance with custom and common practice, for these are the form of human
nature (p.187). A Māori view of the self is discussed as appropriately
non-individualistic, identified more strongly within the collectivist thought and is
narrative based (p.195). It is this radically non-individualistic conception of selfhood
provided by collective traditions and interconnectedness with both other humans
and the land which gives the context for which the individual may seek a life of
flourishing (p.196).
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Perret and Patterson’s commentary on the values-based perspectives in Māori ethics
as a means of seeking a life of flourishing has links with a Western tradition based on
similar considerations connecting to the pursuit of a flourishing life : virtue ethics.
In the rest of this thesis, I will argue that such an approach is a serious contender for
addressing the issues left open by the Royal Society’s recommendations. This
includes the need for a clear theoretical underpinning to strengthen the RSNZ
response to CRISPR and what this theoretical framework might look like in practice
on issues such as potential impacts on future generations and the treatment versus
enhancement debate for a flourishing human life.
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Chapter 3: Introducing Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is a normative theory that emphasizes the development of one’s
character as the source from which all right action is derived, rather than by the
following of an external set of rules that are specifically action guiding. Virtue ethics
is still concerned with what people do, however the focus is on the kind of people we
ought to be. It rests on the assumption that if an individual possesses good moral
character, then the right actions will naturally follow, without a prescriptive list of
rules for action. For the virtue ethicist, the virtues themselves are held as the most
important factor in morality and serve as the foundation of moral behaviour.
In Western philosophical traditions, Aristotle is considered the figurehead for
classical virtue ethics. Aristotelian virtue ethics proposes that humans have a fixed
nature, or the innate essence of a person. It is argued that the way we flourish is by
adhering to that nature. This is what Aristotle describes as ‘proper functioning’
(Wenzel, 2010). Proper functioning holds that everything has a specific function and
a moral agent is functioning well or poorly to the extent that they do or do not fulfil
that function. For humans, proper functioning is concerned with the need to be
healthy, grow and be fertile. Aristotle’s account of virtue ethics asserts that humans
are a ‘rational’ animal, and in this way, we need to function with reason and social
skill in relating to one another (Wentzel, 2010). Adaptations of virtue ethics
stemming from Aristotle have gained popularity within Western philosophical
perspectives in recent decades, offering an alternative to more dominant normative
theories such as deontology and consequentialism.
3.1 Eudaimonia
A core idea within Aristotelian virtue ethics is that developing a virtuous character
serves the moral agent in living a holistically good and purposeful life, known as
‘eudaimonia’ (Wenzel, 2010). Eudaimonia includes the concept of happiness,
although happiness is not the ultimate goal. A life of eudaimonia is rich and
multifaceted. It includes a sense of purpose, the struggle of hard work or delayed
pleasure in achieving overall contentment in one's body and mind and in one's
relationship to the wider community. Eudaimonia acknowledges and allows for the
endurance of short term discomfort for a long term gain. However, if a person is
virtuous, their overall life will flourish and their actions will be ethical. Happiness or
pleasure is the byproduct of purpose, rather than the goal. For the virtue ethicist, in
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order to live a eudaimonic life, it is argued that one must be in possession of certain
essential virtues.
3.1.1 Aristotle’s Virtues
There is considerable debate around what exactly constitutes human flourishing and
therefore also what virtues are essential for this. Aristotle identifies approximately
eighteen virtues that he considered essential for a moral, flourishing life (Irwin,
1975). The virtues according to Aristotle stem from the concept of eudaimonia and
are defined as habits of choice that are determined by reason (Simpson, 1992,
p.507). Aristotle held the view that virtues are not considered to be fully developed
from birth. Rather, they are developed through habituation, parental or other
mentored guidance and training. Once adulthood is reached, then the training can
serve to produce a virtuous person, whereas passions will dominate in a person who
has not been trained in virtuous habits early in life.
Aristotle separated his list of virtues into two parts, those pertaining to emotion,
called ‘moral virtues’ and those pertaining to intelligence ‘intellectual virtues’
(Pakaluk,  2005) (see Table 1 below).
Aristotle describes a virtue as being the golden mean between two vices or extremes,
the vice of excess and the vice of deficiency (Wenzel, 2010). In some cases, this helps
to clarify the meaning of the virtue itself. For example, the virtue of courage is the
‘ideal’ midpoint between the extremes of cowardice and recklessness. So, if someone
witnesses a person being mugged in the street, they might immediately run to the
aid of the victim and stop the mugging, putting themselves in harm’s way to help the
victim. This may seem like the right action to take, but it may also be reckless to do
so without first assessing the situation and taking appropriate action. The properly
courageous person would be able to discern the best course of action based on the
specific circumstances. A reckless person may run head first into danger, while a
coward may avoid the situation altogether in order to preserve their own life at any
cost. If the robber appears to be physically stronger than the witness and therefore
likely to overpower them, then courage may look like calling for assistance rather
than directly confronting the robber. This example demonstrates how a virtue in
different circumstances and involving different agents may produce varied actions
and outcomes. In this way, virtue ethics allows for the adjustment of behaviour to fit
varying circumstances in the world without betraying its core principle of virtue.
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MORAL VIRTUES INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
Courage in the face of fear
Temperance in the face of
pleasure and pain









Friendliness in social conduct
Modesty in the face of shame
or shamelessness
Righteous indignation in the
face of injury
Nous: Intelligence
Nous Episteme: Reasoning skills
in applying scientific principles,
formulas or tools
Sophia: Theoretical wisdom





Techne : Art, craftsmanship
Table 1: Aristotle’s Virtues
3.2 Non Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Perspectives
Aristotle's list is not the only list 0f virtues, however. Despite many of his basic
arguments maintaining relevance today, Aristotle's virtue ethics has been criticised
for being elitist and exclusive in some accounts, with some fundamental and glaring
flaws within Aristotle's worldview, such as his commentary on the role of women
and slaves in society (Vallor, 2016). In light of these criticisms, Neo-Aristotelian
ethics has emerged, retaining the relevant foundational arguments put forward by
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Aristotle and adapting them to be more in keeping with contemporary worldviews
(Statman, 2010).
Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics has been linked to Anscombe’s 1958 essay ‘Modern
Moral Philosophy’. Anscombe asserted that until we have developed an adequate
philosophy of psychology, which at the time she argued as being lacking, any
concepts of moral obligation or duty should be set aside if at all possible. This is
because she argued that they are derivative of one’s character and that detaching
moral duty from its foundation of virtuous character is harmful. Anscombe asserted
that rules or duties toward action that are not first grounded in virtues will produce
harmful and ultimately immoral practical outcomes (Anscombe, 1958, p.14).
Since Anscombe’s work, there has been a resurgence of Neo-Aristotelian virtue
ethics driven by philosophers such as Rosalind Hursthouse and Philippa Foot. Foot
and Hursthouse in particular attach a naturalistic view to virtue ethics, stating that
virtues are tied to our innate status as rational animals and distinguishing features
of the human species (Hursthouse, 1999, p.167). Foot states that it is not considered
unusual or difficult to make evaluative judgements about plants or animal species
behaviour by referring to a general code of behaviour or features considered healthy
or unhealthy, suggesting it is no great stretch to make such judgements of human
nature in the same way (Foot, 1959).
Also, philosophical accounts of normative ethics that are rooted in virtues or
similarly described characteristics for living a good life are documented historically,
within and across cultures. This includes Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity and
arguably, embedded within the Māori worldview in Aotearoa New Zealand (Perret &
Patterson, 1991).
Shannon Vallor discusses some aspects of Aristotle's theory as being based on wrong
assumptions that fail to be relevant to wider cultural perspectives (Vallor, 2016).
Accordingly, Vallor has written detailed comparisons between some Eastern and
Western virtue ethics accounts in the development of her own account of virtues that
she claims are vital to good moral living in the modern age of technology. Vallor
discusses the need for incorporating a wider perspective of virtue ethics from
Confucius, Buddhist, Christian and some more contemporary virtue oriented
philosophies. Vallor states that since we have had the benefit of time to uncover
these faults in Aristotle's philosophy, it stands to reason that we would see more
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come to light as time goes by. In subsequent chapters I will discuss Vallor’s
approach, going on to develop a set of virtues pertaining specifically to gene editing
decisions for Aotearoa New Zealand.
3.3 A Common Criticism of Virtue Ethics
The most common criticism levelled against virtue ethics is that it is insufficiently
action guiding (Zyl, 2009). It is argued that the Virtues themselves as concepts, such
as ‘courage’ or ‘empathy’ are too abstract for adequate practical application in real
world dilemmas. This is because they are subjective and thus difficult to specifically
quantify and measure. Asking a person to be courageous may be more difficult to
interpret in action than asking a person to perform a specific act that represents
courage. Unpacking the meaning of character traits as concepts in and of themselves
takes a series of explanatory steps, whereas a prescriptive guide to action can be
considered less complex to understand and execute consistently. This apparent lack
of clear action guidance is said to render virtue ethics ineffective in giving a clear and
decisive list of actions to take when faced with a morally ambiguous choice.
This criticism rests on some assumptions. First, that a good moral theory must be
able to tell us explicitly what to do. Second, that a character-based moral philosophy
cannot tell us what specific actions to take and furthermore, that a code of conduct,
based on an analysis of duty such as deontology, or a consequentialist utility
calculation, is simple and thorough enough that anyone, regardless of their
character, could do the right thing by following it. Deontic and consequentialist
theories do not regard the role of character as important, but rather the external,
measurable actions that a person takes to uphold the moral maxim or utility
calculation.
In response, the virtue ethicist can acknowledge that it is difficult to know which
factors are generally most important to consider in making moral decisions.
However, when considering the unprecedented ethical challenges ushered in with
CRISPR applications, the flexibility of a theory that relies on virtues rather than
external rules is arguably more compatible with such an unpredictable and complex
external world. Two people of virtuous character could therefore approach the same
morally challenging situation, respond differently to the event and have both actions
be considered morally right (Statman, 1997, ch.1). Character based morality allows
for multiple right responses to ambiguous situations. To the virtue ethicist, because
37
a correct action requires the ability to possess good judgment in order to make a
decision, the focus should be on wisdom as a virtue rather than behavioural rule.
Furthermore, a virtue ethicist can assert that it is not necessary to specify external
rules around actions because if one is to be virtuous they are already in possession of
good judgement and would know what is the right and wrong action at any given
time without explicit rules on actions.
The following section will critically discuss whether this approach is robust enough
to tackle the human complexities involved in applying gene editing technologies. I
will further investigate some key criticisms of virtue ethics from proponents of
consequentialism and deontology, explaining why virtue ethics may be an effective
tool in facing the unique ethical challenges of gene editing and why deontology and
consequentialism are not up to the task in this instance, at least not on their own.
3.4  Virtue Ethics and CRISPR
I have proposed that virtue ethics may be a viable theory for navigating the ethical
challenges of gene editing and the use of emerging gene editing technologies. Virtue
ethics, being character based, claims that we would know which virtues to employ in
a moral dilemma, and we would know this by applying wisdom to the situation,
instead of following a set of moral rules. There are several reasons why virtue ethics
should be considered as a method of informing decisions around the ethical issues
involved with new gene editing technologies such as CRISPR.
3.4.1 Exploring Virtue Ethics as a Viable Normative Theory is Academically
Advantageous
Rosalind Hursthouse makes the claim that aspects of virtue ethics are
underrepresented in normative ethics, particularly the idea that human flourishing
needs to be interpreted in terms of parameters that imply a nuanced understanding
of human nature, in a way that a neutral, ‘matter of fact’ viewpoint cannot capture
(Hursthouse, 1999, ch.8).
The emergence of contemporary virtue ethics as a viable normative philosophy
suggests there may be untapped resources regarding how one may use virtue ethics
in modern moral decision-making. Axtell and Olsen (2012) describe a resurgence of
virtue ethics in the field of applied ethics since the 1970’s, where consequentialist
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and deontological theories have previously dominated the discussion. Therefore, it is
academically advantageous to explore and test its possibilities in practical
application to novel ethical challenges of the likes presented through CRISPR.
Further investigation of virtue ethics in practice may provide some clarity or
alternative solutions. Even if it ultimately transpires that virtue ethics is not the
most viable theory with which to approach the ethical challenges of gene editing
alone, a deeper discussion into its possible practical application in gene editing
creates an opportunity to expand and enrich the debate.
3.4.2 Virtue Ethics:  Robust Against a Background of Change
The agent-centered approach over specific rules for action is the distinguishing
feature of virtue ethics that allows a moral agent to rely on character traits, giving
flexibility regarding which specific actions to take depending on circumstances. A
focus on the cultivation of virtues as opposed to following specific actions may allow
agents to act in a variety of ways in any given situation and still be considered to
have performed a right or moral action. In this way, the agent becomes flexible in
decision-making, even in complex dilemmas without complicated rules or fixed
obligations. This feature is particularly pertinent given the unique and
unprecedented challenges we face with developing gene editing technologies.
Approaching such challenges armed with virtues allows for the kind of flexibility that
can adapt to the particulars of the given situation rather than having to adhere to a
specific rule.
In adopting a flexible, character-over-rules based theory of moral action, individual
decisions might vary in different settings and times even when the core values and
virtues remain stable. In this way, the theory is not compromised. With virtue ethics,
instead of having a rule book for action guidance, one has something more akin to a
toolkit of internal values that can be employed time and time again in a variety of
situations.
3.4.3 Character Exemplars
Another advantageous feature of virtue ethics is that of character exemplars. If an
agent is faced with a moral dilemma in which they are not equipped with the virtues
necessary to make a good choice on their own, they are able to consult with other
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agents, known to possess more developed virtues than themselves. This allows the
agent to act virtuously despite lacking in perfect virtuousness. This makes virtue
ethics accessible to a wide range of agents, even if the agent has not had the
opportunity to develop the virtues in themselves to a perfect standard. In this way,
virtue ethics can be seen to be collaborative over an individualist theory.
3.5 Considering Consequentialism and Deontology
I have discussed some of the reasons for including virtue ethics as a viable normative
theory in dealing with the ethics of gene editing through CRISPR. I will now
compare how it stands up alongside some of the more dominant normative theories,
lending support to my thesis of incorporating virtues into decisions on complex gene
editing cases.
In the interest of brevity I will summarize the basic principles of two major
normative ethical theories, namely consequentialism and deontology, in broad
brushstrokes, going on to explain why they are, on their own, not up to the task of
dealing with the unique ethical challenge of current gene editing technology. I will
show how virtue ethics can be used to fill some of the gaps identified in
consequentialist and deontological approaches.
3.6 A Consequentialist Approach will not be Adequate on its own:
Consequentialism asserts that an action can be deemed morally right or wrong based
on the consequences, or outcomes of the act. For the consequentialist, the intent or
character of a person is not what determines a person’s morality. It is their actions,
and the resulting consequences  alone that matter (Scheffler, 1982).
Early utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill claim that an act
can be considered morally right if and only if it maximises pleasure over pain
(Kagan, 1998, 17–22). Therefore, the measure of whether an act can be considered
right is when the net result of the action maximises the positive minus the negative
consequences for moral agents in a given situation (Moore, 1912, ch. 1–2.) The
utilitarian holds the view that when assessing an act according to its consequences,
we should consider which action most contributes to wellbeing. There are of course
many views regarding what constitutes positive and negative outcomes. For
example, hedonists consider ‘good’ to be what is pleasurable and the ‘bad’ to be pain.
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The next section will outline several main criticisms of consequentialism as an
adequate approach alone to ethical issues around emerging gene editing
technologies.
3.6.1  The Measure of Utility is Unclear: What will Future People Want?
By working within a formula focussed on calculation of utility, the Act
consequentialist encounters an admittedly well known epistemic problem of
knowing what measure of utility use (Hull, et al., 1973). The highest utility could be
based on economics, happiness, health, or some other measure entirely. When
considering CRISPR, the measure of utility, or what we think will hold positive value
for people becomes unstable. For example, if we could make humans more
intelligent through CRISPR, this may seem like it would equate to positive utility,
but we could not confidently claim that higher intelligence would lead to an effective
increase in utility, considering we would be changing humans as we know them
today. By focussing on cultivating values such as ‘kindness’ instead of utility
measures like ‘happiness’ the virtue ethicist avoids having to provide an account for
what will be considered positive utility. The virtue ethicist can also be more
confident that ‘kindness’ as a character trait, manifesting in a variety of ways in the
external world, will be important regardless of changing circumstances within and
around humans over time.
An important difference between happiness as a measure of utility and virtues such
as kindness is that the latter are inward states instead of outward occurrences to be
measured. Internal character states cannot be measured, nor do they require
measurement. Being asked to cultivate kindness in oneself does not require the
ability to quantify and compare degrees of kindness. What matters is that a person is
simply ‘kind’. The effects of kindness could be measured in some instances, but this
is not the basic requirement for being virtuous. Because virtue ethics is not wholly
predicated on measuring utility, it has some resilience as a normative theory against
an ever changing ethical backdrop and may go some way to fill the gap presented by
the measure of utility problem within consequentialism.
There is possibly an argument for consequentialism being ‘values-driven’ but not
explicitly so. Consequentialists may respond that the concept of happiness as a
measure of utility is also enduring and will also manifest in different ways. However,
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there are questions around our ability to predict what will be considered as
representing positive utility in the future, particularly if gene editing has the
potential to make fundamental changes to human beings. Alternatively if we say “be
someone who is kind”, what kindness looks like is immaterial, but being a kind
person is still valuable to society.
Consequentialism is bound by the requirement to figure out what will cause
maximum utility. It is plausible to assume that people will still value justice or
kindness in the future but it is more difficult to predict people's measures of utility.
Not confidently knowing what others want or what others may want in the future is a
standard, but valid concern for utility calculations. In the case of gene editing
however, we are considering altering the people themselves, and CRISPR is
changing the game at such a rapid pace, so the potential for a disconnect between
preferences for humans today and future humans will likely be markedly increased.
3.6.2 The Issue of Consequences
Even if we could set up a consequentialist calculation aimed towards an accurate
measure of utility, there remains a significant problem in calculating the
consequences. For example, it is unclear how we would anticipate and calculate the
consequences of having people with genetically enhanced intelligence. Predicting
which actions will produce positive utility through gene editing will not only vary
between us and other populations, but it becomes even more complicated to
determine within the context of gene editing as we are actively changing what the
future moral agent will be like. It is possible that engineering such an advantage
amongst a population of people could lead to greater socio economic consequences,
such as widening wealth gaps between those who are better qualified for certain jobs
or who are able to perform at a higher level in certain industries.
Because gene editing involves changing humans, accurately predicting or
quantifying the consequences of such changes is a monumental task, one that would
be impossible to accurately determine. This brings forward the question of whether
increased human intelligence, as just one example, could bring us closer towards
utopia or tyranny. Furthermore, it would be difficult to predict which one of these
outcomes may occur. Saying we should do something if the outcome will increase
happiness for example, just cannot be accurately assessed. With the social
42
environment becoming increasingly unstable due to the fact that gene editing is
altering humans, calculating consequences becomes increasingly difficult.
There is also the possibility that poorly regulated gene editing could result in a
consequence that is ultimately completely destructive to humans. Balancing that
scenario with other outcomes is therefore impossible. When the stakes are that high,
the calculations are automatically swamped by the possibility of total destruction.
Even though consequentialism is very sophisticated and in many cases a useful
normative view, there remain concerning gaps in the theory when we are
considering making decisions on CRISPR applications. Consequentialism is, in
many cases, an effective theory for making judgements of utility based on known
parameters of pain or wellbeing but when these parameters are increasingly flexible
and even unstable, consequentialism encounters a significant problem.
This is not to say that we should not be considering consequences at all in our
decision-making processes for gene editing. It becomes problematic when the basis
of our decisions rests on predicted outcomes, particularly in situations for which we
may have no similar past outcomes to refer to for consequentialist calculations.
Basing decisions on arguably more stable inward character traits or values, shifts the
aim of applying gene editing decisions from being focussed on outcomes, to
observing character traits aimed at human flourishing overall. Consequences are a
factor, but should not be a main driver of decision-making for gene editing when the
parameters of such calculations are difficult and sometimes impossible to accurately
determine.
Therefore, it does not follow that we should adopt a normative ethical theory that is
perfectly prescriptive as it is not functional for everyday life, especially when what is
‘known’ about life is changing, even at its very foundations. The practicality of
consequentialism relies heavily upon our collective inheritance of centuries of
accumulated moral wisdom about how to maximise utility in the “known human
environment.” (Vallor, 2016, p.19). In particular, Act Utilitarian calculations require
the presence of ‘knowns’ or some concrete parameters in order to even set up a
calculation of utility. Gene editing challenges these knowns, these previous concrete
parameters, increasing the difficulty in setting up determinants of action guidance.
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3.7  A Deontological Approach will not be Adequate on its own
Some who reject a consequentialist approach may look to deontology as a basis for
decision-making in gene editing applications through the likes of CRISPR.
Deontology holds that what determines whether an action is moral is based on the
rule that produces the action. Immanuel Kant is regarded as a figurehead for
Western deontological philosophy. Kant asserted that morality comes from adhering
to an overarching moral rule he called the ‘Categorical Imperative’ (Williams, 1968).
Kant described the Categorical Imperative as a standard, objective and necessary
principle that must always be followed, regardless of the circumstances or any
desires we may have to the contrary. Kant asserted that all moral requirements are
justified by this principle, therefore all actions that violate the Categorical
Imperative are immoral (Williams, 1968). Deontology assesses the choices of what
we do based on notions of what we ought to do rather than guiding what sort of
person we should be or what the consequences of our actions should be (Isenberg,
1964). Deontology uses moral rules to determine right from wrong, such as ‘do not
lie’, ‘do not cheat’ or ‘do not kill’. Because deontology requires that a person does
their moral duty by following these rules for behaviour regardless of circumstance, it
is said to be relatively simple to apply (Isenberg, 1964).
For example, the deontologist may assert that taking another person’s life is never
right, even in self defence and lying is always wrong, even if it is done to protect
someone’s safety. The idea that choices cannot be justified by the effects regardless
of how much positive utility they may generate puts deontology in opposition to
consequentialism as a normative theory. The deontologist would consider some
actions to be right simply by the level at which the moral norm is adhered to, even if
the act does not maximise the good in consequence (Scheffler, 1982). Deontology
relies on the strict adherence to certain moral obligations both to the agent
themselves (Agent-centered Deontology) and to others (Patient-centered
Deontology) (Kamm, 2007). When faced with unprecedented moral dilemmas, such
as those which CRISPR will likely bring to fore, it could be tempting to adopt a
specific and simple to follow set of rules on the subject. This seems like it could offer
a measure of certainty in ethically uncertain terrain.
However, a deontological approach comes up against some significant issues within
the context of gene editing. The circumstances requiring moral decisions continually
change across cultures and over time. Once we introduce new ways for human
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beings to be in the world, ways that we can create within ourselves through CRISPR,
moral absolutes quickly begin to lose their relevance and reliability. In a similar
problem to the one presented against consequentialism, if we change humans, then
it is increasingly likely that rules suited to humans today may not be suited, or even
remotely relevant to humans in the future, depending on how much human life
differs from what we know today through gene editing. Something like ‘do no harm’
becomes increasingly difficult when the ability to affect and manipulate biology in
many different ways is now more open and complex. For example, manipulation of a
genome to eradicate Achondroplasia (a type of dwarfism) may be seen as ‘killing’ of a
certain characteristic or kind of person. As stated in Chapter 2, there are groups who
fear that their very identity as determined by their DNA is now being threatened,
and in the future, others like them will no longer exist. Against a backdrop of rapidly
advancing gene editing technologies, such moral maxims become difficult to
interpret or apply in such an ethically complex environment. If one was to follow a
deontological set of moral rules, it may be that these rules would need to change, or
new rules would need to be added to maintain relevance in a vastly different society.
Because virtue ethics is based on internal values, rather than rules for action, it
avoids the trap of having to modify or create such rules in response to changing
external circumstances. Virtue ethics incorporates space for circumstantial change
without having to modify a code or rule system. Instead, virtue ethics claims that
moral principles codify in very general ways as patterns of reasoning by virtuous
persons.
Difficulty in applying moral maxims could lead to either too much discretion or an
overly blunt response to ethical decisions. A system of rules will be difficult to apply
regarding something so personal as one’s genetics, across multiple cultures. A rule
based approach relies on an assumption that people generally have similar views
about what would constitute a good society, with such views stemming from
individual wants and needs. However, moral maxims are products of inherently
imperfect societies and with gene editing, may soon no longer be universally
applicable. The inflexible moral maxim thus becomes both too vague in one sense
and too rigid in another when practically applied.
Shannon Vallor discusses Immanuel Kant's moral rule system as highly abstract and
overly generalised, telling us too little about the true shape of modern moral life. It is
unclear whether the dutiful deontologist could imagine a future where we can
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radically modify the human genome through CRISPR and where any of these
possible worlds could be clearly envisioned to guide a person's will (Vallor, 2016,
p.16). If even a fraction of the possibilities of the uses for CRISPR are considered, the
practical uncertainties will likely overtake the moral rule of the deontologist, stalling
consistent rational moral action.
With an approach based on virtues rather than moral rules, these liabilities can be
mitigated. Using a revised set of moral virtues brings us closer to being able to
accommodate for the values that are likely to remain important for future
generations, even genetically modified ones. Virtue ethics is not precisely action
guiding, but it allows for more flexibility in action without having to change its core
theoretical structure. It may be that some general rules are useful in gene editing
applications, however virtue ethics may offer the flexibility that is lacking in a purely
deontological approach.
3.8  Virtue Ethics as a Toolkit for Morally Right Action
As discussed, there are good reasons to consider consequentialism and deontology in
our approach to CRISPR. However, I have highlighted that there will still be gaps in
applying these theories in practice to this issue. There is a need for a novel approach
to how we make decisions based on the unique ethical challenges we are facing
through CRISPR.
Virtue ethics does not necessarily claim to be specifically action guiding, but neither
does it claim that it must be action guiding for it to be a useful ethical theory. It can
inform our actions but not prescribe them specifically. This is a main point of
difference between virtue ethics, being character based, and consequentialism or
deontology which are based on external rules and formulas. The rapidly changing
situation advanced through gene editing technologies such as CRISPR creates a
challenge for setting specific rules for right action. It seems right that in order to
have a guide to action, there is a need to at least supplement prescriptive formulas
for ‘utility’  with a framework based on principles such as what virtue ethics offers.
Virtue ethics is a normative ethical theory that offers flexibility, can accommodate
for uncertainty and allows people some freedom to explore a variety of outcomes in
action that are all morally ‘good’ or ‘right’. I advocate for an ethical ‘toolkit’ over an
ethical ‘rule book’. This ethical toolkit takes a systematic approach consisting of a
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collection of virtues specifically chosen for relevance in making ethically sound
policy decisions relating to the use of gene editing technologies such as CRISPR in
humans. The goal is that this ethical toolkit will be employable in a variety of
situations to do with gene editing for which we have no clear way of predicting
outcomes. The proposed toolkit will give structure and integrity to our actions by
grounding them in specific virtues, but it will allow for a number of specific actions
to any particular dilemma that are deemed ‘right’, or in the interests of promoting
human flourishing.
3.9 Relativism and Virtue Ethics
As noted earlier, one criticism leveled at virtue ethics is that it is too flexible or not
action guiding enough (Hursthouse, 1999, ch.1). However, virtue ethics retains a
sense of structure and integrity due to the framework of clearly defined principles
that can be applied to a multitude of circumstances, allowing for right action even if
the specific action differs according to the circumstance. Adapting our ethical
decisions based on intuition alone would lead to difficulty in defending these
decisions based on consistent grounds. It is necessary to be able to update our views
and regulations to new and changing situations, but it is equally necessary to adhere
to a solid theoretical foundation for this. The kinds of questions that need to be
addressed for the use of gene editing technologies are not the yes or no, right or
wrong kind of answers, but more nuanced questions like, “in what ways will gene
editing change us? How might it hurt or help us? What does it mean to be an
enhanced human being?’ These are all the kinds of value laden questions that virtue
ethics is exactly equipped to help us deal with. Gene editing will change humans,
therefore the implications of what is the ‘right kind of human’ becomes important in
a way that we have never had to face before.
Therefore, for gene editing, being less prescriptive is not so much a problem with the
theory but a feature. Virtue ethics is not prescriptive but it does have common
teleological value in that it aims for the attainment of a flourishing life through
developing a virtuous character. Having an account of a virtuous character grounds
the theory, preventing it from becoming overly relativistic.
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3.10 Against ‘Value Free’ Decision-Making.
Moral decisions on gene editing are complex and emotional, particularly when
facing the possibility of altering humans. Attempting to apply a formula or make
decisions on a purely rational basis, that is, removing bias and emotional
motivations, is not the right parameter to be working with because this is a
discussion about what it means to be a human. The effects of gene editing in humans
are more complex and far reaching than economic impact or even life and death.
Gene editing deals directly to the issue of quality of life and our individual and
collective ideas of ‘flourishing’ as a human. This can include those things that cannot
be measured or quantified in a formulaic way. To attempt to make decisions relying
primarily on rationality is to pretend that these emotional value judgements and
biases do not exist or do not matter.
A study by Jan Nielsen (2012) discusses how individuals will often invoke scientific
fact in moral decisions that are value laden. Nielsen uses examples of discussions
around decisions dealing with gene editing which are inherently value laden,
allowing for bias to creep in to the decision-making process. Given that values and
bias are involved in these decisions, Nielsen (2012) recommends that researchers
apply analytical frameworks that are able to take into account the dialectical aspects
of reasoning and moral decision-making. Vallor (2016, ch.1) states that the impact
of the unconscious mind and cognitive biases on moral behaviour is entirely
compatible with virtue ethics which already regards moral behaviour as imperfect
and variable within contexts. Explicit acknowledgement of emotions in
decision-making is to be accepted and managed rather than ignored or mitigated.
This gives decision-makers a more nuanced and complete picture of each case in
order to make a decision.
Furthermore, when unconscious bias can be discovered it can be managed by a
range of compensating moral and social techniques. Virtue ethics is transparent
about acknowledging the role of emotions, culture and values in the decision-making
process. Virtues are, and must be, grounded in a particular context. Virtue ethics
acknowledges that ethical issues are human issues, full of human complexities,
making it difficult to justify a claim of complete impartiality in moral
decision-making.
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It is necessary to incorporate and acknowledge culture and values as an integral part
of the decision-making process, not something to be set aside. Including an
awareness of the complex psychological processes in our decision-making around
technology allows us to be conscious of their effects in our policy formation.
It would be beneficial, when applying technology that would directly affect humanity
as it engages with it at a fundamental, genetic level, that we employ an ethical toolkit
equipped to deal with such situations. This includes the ability to acknowledge and
make explicit such biases and assumptions that underpin ethical decisions.
Including such complex psychological processes in our decision-making around gene
editing technology may allow for more holistic awareness of their effects in policy
formation. An ethical toolkit based on virtue ethics is a novel and viable approach to
ethical decision-making pertaining to gene editing applications, alongside deontic
obligations or consequentialist calculations.
3.11  Towards a Modern Virtue Ethics
I have argued for virtue ethics as a viable theory to adopt when discussing the ethical
challenges of gene editing, however there remain issues regarding which values
remain relatively stable across cultures and over time. There are also questions
around how absolute or structured the basic framework should be, and which virtues
will be applicable for gene editing specifically. It is crucial to attempt to identify
which virtues are necessary to employ in ethical decisions pertaining to gene editing
applications such as CRISPR. This will require identifying a position that is broad
enough to be widely acceptable but specific enough that it's not empty in practical
application. The case for developing a virtue ethical system for gene editing and
CRISPR is made more difficult because it requires an attempt to be in accordance
with future generations’ values. I accept that the criticisms of virtue ethics being
lacking in specific action guidance is significant and requires a response. In the
subsequent chapters I will consider the practicalities of deploying virtue ethics and
suggest ways to overcome this particular concern.
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Chapter 4: Developing a Toolkit of Virtues
In this chapter, I will develop and defend a toolkit of virtues regarding human gene
editing applications that I see as especially pertinent to decision-makers in Aotearoa
New Zealand. In order to do this, I will first expand on the concept of human
flourishing and what it might mean to live a ‘good’ life. I will then discuss and
compare a classical virtue ethics list of essential virtues with a more modern take on
virtue ethics, showing how they may be applied to the use of CRISPR, based on the
unique ethical challenges already identified, and with an acknowledgment of
significant future unknowns. Finally, I will develop a toolkit of essential virtues for
decision-makers in Aotearoa New Zealand, motivating these virtues from within a
framework of indigenous perspectives.
4.1 Human Flourishing: A Good Life
The first step in developing an essential toolkit of virtues is to ground them within a
specific structure, so as to avoid falling into the trap of ‘making it up as we go along’,
or relativistic thinking. It is important to have a clear understanding of what is
meant by eudaimonia in this context in order to examine and choose the relevant
virtues for approaching gene editing decisions.
There are various views on what human flourishing actually looks like in practice
amongst the virtue ethical theories. This makes it difficult to determine whether
there can be one unified account of ‘the good life’ that will have a broad application.
It seems important that we find such a robust account, given how deep and
widespread the effects of CRISPR might be. If some foundational common ground
can be found, then this might increase confidence in the approach.
It is therefore necessary to attempt to identify some common features amongst
virtue traditions, pointing out whether there are some shared ideas about the human
good or the virtuous person. So far I have noted a concept of the good life, as
described through Aristotelian eudaimonia. There are alternative conceptions of
human flourishing to be found in virtue based traditions across different cultures. In
developing her list of virtues, Shannon Vallor (2016), outlines the main concepts of
three classical virtue traditions referred to in chapter two of her book, ‘Technology
and the Virtues: A Philosophical Guide to a Future Worth Wanting’. In later
sections I will discuss the particular list of virtues she espouses for the management
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of emerging technologies. First, I will outline the key tenets of flourishing Vallor
bases her list on, drawing common key elements regarding human flourishing on
which to develop essential virtues that guide a person to this aim.
First, Vallor examines Aristotelian virtue ethics, discussing flourishing in terms of
eudaimonia which is cultivated through the individual habitual practice of virtues in
action, using character exemplars as a guide in developing these virtues to their full
expression. Having already discussed Aristotle in the previous chapter of this
project, I will simply highlight that a key feature in Aristotle’s idea of achieving
eudaimonia is that it is viewed primarily as an individualistic process.
Second, Vallor discusses Confucian ethics. Classical Confucianism maintains a stable
core centred on the need for the cultivation of moral virtues to enable harmony
within family relationships which gradually extends outwards to the wider
community and promotes political flourishing. Confucians were concerned with the
nature and psychological structure of virtues, particularly those focussed on
fostering and upholding harmonious human relationships (Birdwhistell, 1989).
Unlike Aristotelian virtue ethics, the Confusian self is interconnected and not
isolated. It is defined by reciprocal obligations to others. Achieving harmony with
The Way (Dao) is the Confucian ideal for the flourishing human life.
This is said to be achieved through the practice of rituals which express attitudes of
respect and deference in everything from familial conduct to dress and presentation
(Vallor, 2016, ch.2). This however is not to be conflated with blind following of ritual
but is instead embedded in developing a sensitivity to people’s needs within various
contexts. There is a notable similarity between the idea of human flourishing
through habitual cultivation of certain virtues between Aristotelian and Confucian
ethics. However, the key difference is that Confucianism prioritises family
relationships where Aristotle is more agent centered.
Finally, Vallor comments on the idea of flourishing within Buddhism. Buddhism
views the ideal human life as one that seeks to attain Nirvana, a transcendent state
in which there is neither suffering, desire, nor sense of self, and the subject is
released from the effects of karma and the cycle of death and rebirth (Bodhi, 1984).
According to Buddhist philosophy, all beings are causally connected and suffering
can be transcended through a cycle of rebirths, eventually reaching nirvana or
enlightenment (Vallor, 2016, ch2).
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Buddhism upholds demanding ethical values, such as the Four Noble Truths and the
Noble Eightfold Path (Bodhi, 1984). However, Buddhism recognizes the need to
adapt those values to the changing circumstances of the real world. Similar to
Aristotelian virtues and Confucianism, at the core of Buddhism is guiding one to
becoming the right sort of person, living in a way that is worthy of human aspiration.
The principles found in the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path are
therefore a guide towards that goal. It is not just the rituals and practices that are
important, but the ability to connect intelligent awareness to such practices within a
variety of contexts. It is not just the action that matters but the spirit in which it is
performed which is considered truly virtuous or noble.
A similarity between Buddhism and Aristotelian virtue ethics is the use of character
exemplars such as the Buddah, who is seen to have attained enlightenment and can
thus guide others towards it. However, Buddhism differs significantly from other
theories in the type of principles they uphold. For example, Buddhism upholds
humility, detached equanimity and compassion, whilst Aristotle upholds warranted
pride, appropriate ambition and righteous indignation. Furthermore, Buddhism is
concerned with relieving suffering for all creatures, whilst Conficiansim focuses on
the familial relationships more highly than on the wider natural world. This
apparent detachment from wealth and earthly possessions stands in contrast to
Aristotle's view that poverty and material lack are obstacles to human flourishing
(Vallor, 2016, ch.2).
It is clear that there are differences in the precise interpretation of what leads to
‘flourishing’, but there is a shared idea of a good, moral life amongst cultures and
throughout time based on certain virtues cultivated through habitual practice. This
common goal of human flourishing is the reason for cultivating internal virtues
across these systems.
Vallor asserts that the internal character cultivation necessary to living a good,
flourishing life is a process that happens within a shared context, through our
interactions with others in our communities. Acquiring and developing virtues is not
an isolated process, even if Aristotle’s version seems to point more to an
individualistic view. But even with an idea of common goals for virtuous living, there
remains the question of which actual virtues are agreed upon for achieving this goal.
For example, it is difficult to assume and assert that everyone believes in the
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fundamental importance of being courageous. There are some core theoretical ideas
which underpin virtue theory, but when it comes to discussing particular virtues that
are most important to cultivate, there is much more room for debate.
However, I do not see this as a problem, but a feature of the theory in its flexibility.
By giving virtue ethics a foundation in the shared theoretical commitments of
flourishing, one can allow for specific virtues to be given greater or lesser importance
than others across varying cultural and historical contexts. For example, an
unprecedented moral dilemma regarding a specific genetic enhancement with
unclear long-term consequences may require a greater degree of flexibility in
thinking of novel solutions and courage in taking decisive action, more so than
civility or kindness. This is not to say that these latter virtues do not play a role.
However, with a shared understanding of human flourishing as a framework, the
virtues can be employed to varying degrees depending on the circumstance at hand.
It is highly doubtful that Aristotle was thinking about a world where issues such as
artificial intelligence or the editing of the human genome were possible. However,
because of shared commitments towards the idea of a flourishing life, modern
philosophers such as Shannon Vallor could use Aristotle’s virtue theory in the
grounding and development of virtue ethics in a modern context. It is therefore my
aim to develop the theory in such a way that it can be applied more specifically to the
issue of gene editing technologies while retaining the theoretical backdrop of human
flourishing. This will also be directly connected to the need for a stable core theory of
human flourishing to anchor the virtues against the rapid changes we will likely
encounter  in the near future through CRISPR.
4.2 Considering the Virtues
I have chosen to discuss and compare Aristotle and Shannon Vallor’s virtue lists
because Aristotle is considered the founder of classical virtue theory, at least from a
Western perspective. Shannon Vallor is a modern philosopher who has incorporated
Aristotlelian virtues, Confucianism and Buddhism into her approach. Furthermore,
Vallor has tailored her list of virtues to be applied in a modern context. She
particularly emphasises the virtues required for dealing with the ethical challenges
of technological advancement more generally, including increased surveillance,
social media, artificial intelligence and gene editing. As well as examining these
previously proposed lists of virtues, I will use a theoretical basis incorporating the
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key notion of eudaimonia, because it serves as a foundational purpose of acquiring
and practicing virtues. Finally, turning my focus towards a local context, I will
discuss concepts within Tikanga Māori, using this to structure my approach on how
decision-makers may apply these concepts to gene editing applications in Aotearoa
New Zealand.
4.2.1 Aristotle's List
In spite of the comments on how Aristotle’s theory can be used in a contemporary
context, there are some problems with trying to import Aristotle into modern
technological ethics. When considering Aristotle's list of virtues, there are
immediately some virtues that can be set aside and some others which may be more
succinctly combined into one virtue. I acknowledge that I am also judiciously
interpreting the virtues of Aristotle for a more modern technological setting,
specifically the setting of gene editing through CRISPR. However, given this, it is
interesting when exploring Aristotle’s list just how many of his virtues do still hold
relevance. This is an example of how virtues can be relatively timeless and applicable
across a variety of contexts. I will comment on those which I wish to incorporate into
my own toolkit of virtues for decision-makers and give reasons why they should be
included.
First, Aristotle's list of intellectual virtues, being Nous (intelligence), Episteme
(critical reasoning and factual analysis) and Sophia (theoretical wisdom), are all
baseline requirements for decision-makers regarding gene editing
recommendations. Decision-makers need to possess a fundamental ability to think
critically, reason with others, analyse facts and evidence, applying knowledge and
experience from their respective fields of expertise in an appropriate manner to the
ethical dilemmas that arise through gene editing technologies.
Second, the virtues which I believe are less relevant to the context of gene editing
practices more specifically are the following: magnificence with great wealth and
possessions, magnanimity with great honours, wittiness in conversation and
modesty in the face of shame or shamelessness. This is not to say that these virtues
are not relevant in other contexts, but for the purposes of finding a key set of virtues
for decision-makers, or those tasked with designing and implementing policy
regarding gene editing procedures, I believe there are others which hold greater
relevance.
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Looking towards the remaining moral virtues on Aristotle’s list, there are some
which are particularly significant and relevant to decision-makers on their own and
others which I suggest are better encapsulated into a single concept within the
context of gene editing.
1) Courage in the face of fear, temperance in the face of pleasure and pain.
Decision-makers will need to embody the correct levels of risk awareness when faced
with unique ethical dilemmas. CRISPR has presented humanity with a rapidly
expanding list of moral and ethical dilemmas, many of which will require a level of
courage to act without fully knowing the long-term consequences. Courage will be
especially important when dealing with moral dilemmas which are so new, because
there is not yet a long history of similar situations to draw from. Many decisions will
be made as ‘firsts’. Aristotle discusses temperance to mean primarily an avoidance of
over indulgence in hedonistic pleasures. However, in the context of gene editing,
temperance is also necessary as a form of humility to balance courage. That way,
decision-makers can make courageous decisions whilst still retaining a sense of
proper caution to recognise that developing technology will likely have some
unknown pitfalls. There will be gaps in knowledge that need time to be worked
through, both in research and in practice and this needs to be kept in mind alongside
the emergence of exciting new possibilities for human life.
2) Liberality with wealth and possessions.
In this instance, Aristotle is primarily referring to a kind of generosity with regard to
material possessions. However, I see this as being applicable to gene editing in the
sense of being generous with sharing information and knowledge. Incorporating an
open attitude to information sharing as opposed to encouraging the privatisation
and commercialisation of gene editing techniques is useful, for instance if private
entities began to consider patenting particular gene editing methods and even
particular genes. Increased access to research information has the potential to
decrease risk of harm from poor oversight into research practice and monetizing
gene editing applications, thereby increasing opportunities to bring thoroughly
tested, safer gene editing applications to the wider public, not just those who can
afford access to it. Decision-makers should not only be open with their information
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sources but encourage and foster solidarity and generosity amongst those working in
the field.
3) Friendliness in Social Conduct, Righteous Indignation in the Face of Injury.
These virtues could be tied in loosely with liberality, however, I see them more
strongly linked with ideas around civility, justice, empathy and care for the local and
global community. Decision-makers should recommend practices that foster
equality along political, social and economic lines. Decisions will ideally reflect a
desire for justice, care for others and a commitment to using CRISPR as a tool
towards reducing existing inequalities, rather than working to serve private interests
that could advantage certain groups over others.
The relevance of Aristotle's virtues in moral decision-making for gene editing is
testament to the enduring character of virtue ethics. The virtues that have been
omitted from deeper discussion here is not a suggestion that they are wrong, rather
it is a suggestion that in the specific context of gene editing applications, they may
hold less relevance. It shows how virtues remain relatively stable, with their
application being varied and broad, across time and culture. This supports the
assertion that an ethical toolkit based on virtues is a viable approach to moral
dilemmas that society faces through developing technologies, even those which we
have not yet imagined.
4.2.2 Shannon Vallor’s list
In the sixth chapter of her book, Shannon Vallor outlines what she believes to be the
essential virtues to be explored in depth for the flourishing of humans in the
technosocial climate, defined as our changing technologies being increasingly
“embedded in co-evolving social practices, values, and institutions'' rather than
being separate entities (Vallor, 2016, p.6). This technosocial climate denotes
increased moral challenges we face through rapidly developing technologies. Vallor
acknowledges that Aristotle's virtue theory has significant problems and
ambiguities, particularly regarding issues of social inequity and discrimination along
gender lines. Thus, Vallor advocates for a modern Virtue Ethics that incorporates a
more diverse and inclusive range of approaches rather than a single theoretical
framework. “We need to cultivate in ourselves, collectively, a special kind of moral
character, one that I will call the ‘technomoral virtues’ ” (Vallor, 2016,  p.2).
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1) Honesty
Vallor defines honesty as an exemplary respect for truth, along with the practical
expertise to express that respect appropriately in technosocial contexts, which
include contexts such as the online environment. Vallor states that human
flourishing in social environments has never been able to endure without established
norms of honesty.
2) Self Control
Defined as the exemplary ability in technosocial contexts to choose and ideally desire
for their own sake, those goods and experiences that most contribute to
contemporary and future human flourishing. Being self controlled is to reliably and
deliberately align one’s desires with the good.
3) Humility
Humility is defined as a recognition of the real limits of our technosocial knowledge
and ability, and renunciation of the blind faith that new technologies inevitably lead
to human mastery and control of our environment.
4) Courage
Vallor defines spiritual and moral courage as the constant renewal of the choice to
live well rather than badly, whatever else this may cost us. Technomoral courage is
the reliable disposition towards careful awareness and optimism with respect to the
moral and material dangers and opportunities presented by emerging technologies.
It is especially pertinent today as our choices no longer just affect those around us
but sometimes, the entire global community.
5) Justice
Vallor defines justice as divided into two interrelated character traits. The first is the
reliable disposition to seek a fair and equitable distribution of the benefits and risks
of emerging technologies. The second is a concern for how emerging technologies
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impact the basic rights, dignity or welfare of individuals and groups. Justice entails
pursuing values of non harm and beneficence with fairness and accountability.
6) Care and Empathy
Care is defined as a tendency to actively foster the good of others to whom one is
bound by familial or political ties. Vallor defines “technomoral care” as a skillful,
attentive, responsible and emotionally responsive disposition to personally meet the
needs of those with whom we share our environment. This is different to empathy.
Empathy is the appropriate emotional response as compassion for another person's
suffering or need. Care denotes one’s ability to respond to that need in order to
alleviate another's suffering or better someone’s life. Vallor argues that possessing
empathy without care is not effective in action.
7) Civility
Civility is provisionally defined as a sincere disposition to live well with one’s fellow
citizens of a globally networked society; working cooperatively toward those goods
that we seek and expect to share with others. For decision-makers in gene editing I
see this as interconnected with Justice, Empathy and Care. For this reason I will not
be including it as a separate virtue in my own toolkit of virtues.
8) Flexibility
This is the skillful adaptation to change as called for by novel, unpredictable,
frustrating or unstable technosocial conditions. For decision-makers in gene editing,
this is a particularly important virtue when considering the unknown consequences
of emerging technologies.
9) Perspective
Moral perspective is the ability to see how one's own desire at any given moment can
be appropriately scaled within a broader picture of others’ desires and values. This is
more complex than simply having moral knowledge. For example, one may be able
to intellectually process the statement that one’s own needs and desires are not all
that unique or important compared to others’ needs in the big picture. This
knowledge does not mean that one will actually be able to see the world in that light
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when one’s own desires are activated at a non intellectual level. For decision-makers
involved in gene editing policy, perspective does seem useful, however, I see this as
being encapsulated with wisdom, which I will expand more upon in my own toolkit
of virtues.
10) Magnanimity
This refers to those who have rightly earned the moral trust of others and who can
guide others toward the good, or toward behaviours that promote human
flourishing. The magnanimous person would behave such a way that they accept any
honours, accolades and authority they have received with a sense of confidence and
pride that is free from vanity and excessive self-promotion. For decision-makers, I
do not see this as being a strong candidate for inclusion on the list of virtues. This
may become a more important virtue in the future as gene editing becomes more
integrated into ‘normal life’, but currently there are no clear character examples for
gene editing specifically. Other virtues I will mention offer guidance for
decision-makers whilst waiting to acquire further knowledge and experience in this
emerging field. There are certainly ‘characters’ in the gene editing CRISPR world, as
referred to in chapter 2,  but whether they are to be emulated is still unclear.
11) Technomoral wisdom
This virtue encompasses all the other virtues. Practical wisdom can be seen in the
person who reliably puts into practice the other virtues Vallor has listed, to the right
degree and in the right time. It is less of a specific virtue and more of a general
condition of well cultivated and integrated moral expertise. This virtue is both a
separate virtue on its own but it can also be read as the culmination of being in
possession of all the other virtues Vallor has listed. What distinguishes wisdom from
the other virtues is that it is the key tool in the toolkit of virtues.
Vallor (2016, p.23), discusses the need for practical wisdom and moral intelligence
in virtuous behaviour. Following rules or principles exactly but without any
sensitivity to the nuances of emotional responses to some situations requires social
intelligence and a keen awareness of the motivations, feelings, beliefs and desires of
others in specific situations. Having wisdom means possessing the ability to know
which virtues to employ at any one time and to which degree. For this reason I will
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expand on this in my own discussion on essential virtues for gene editing
decision-makers specifically.
4.3 Cultural Perspectives on Gene Editing in Aotearoa New Zealand
The collection of virtues I propose are based on the characteristics I see as especially
important for those who are at the forefront of navigating morally ambiguous or
contentious cases where gene editing in Aotearoa New Zealand is concerned.
Thus far I have presented this approach in ‘lists’ of virtues. However, given the
complexity of the issues within gene editing, I propose an even less rigid structure in
choosing a collection, or toolkit, of important virtues. My aim in this section is that
by looking at the virtues required for decisions in gene editing we will be able to
discuss them specifically in terms of how they relate to one another. So, rather than
a list of virtues, I propose a toolkit of values which interact with one another to
varying degrees dependent on the case at hand. With this structure in mind I will
endeavour to select an appropriate set of values that I see as especially relevant to an
age of widespread, cheap gene editing, and in particular to Aotearoa New Zealand’s
approach to this issue.
First, contextualising our global position is important. Whilst part of a global
community, the toolkit of virtues I will describe underpin the importance of a local
perspective within the wider gene editing debate. Particularly, it is important that
the values proposed stem from and remain grounded within principles of Tikanga
Māori.
Hudson, et al. (2019), compiled a literature review canvassing the consistent
messages of key Māori cultural concepts and values relevant to research on gene
editing. The review noted that concepts of whakapapa (genealogy) are of paramount
importance within Māori communities. Stemming from this concept, values such as
mauri (life essence), mana (power/authority), and kaitiakitanga (guardianship)
were further vital considerations. The review also noted aspects of gene editing as
being linked to concepts such as kawa (customary principles), tika (the right or
correct), and manaakitanga (to care for) for decision-making and policy formation.
Concepts of tapu (sacred), taonga (precious), and wairua (spirit) were linked more
specifically with the genetic material being manipulated or passed on generationally.
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In Māori leadership, a leader's focus is said to be on enabling others to fulfil their
roles rather than on self promotion (Roche, 2019). For decision-makers regarding
gene editing, this encompasses virtues of wisdom, perspective and flexibility. Good
leadership stemming from humility rather than a display of power may offer a fresh
perspective on other notions of the meaning of  leadership.
I have thus developed a set of virtues identified from Aristotle and Vallor’s accounts,
whilst being led by Māori cultural perspectives. There are some virtues in these
accounts that I believe hold significant importance here. These include honesty,
wisdom and courage. There is a certain level of crossover between some of the
virtues I have examined, and so these can be combined. The following section
outlines the virtues I propose as essential for decision-makers for gene editing cases
in Aotearoa New Zealand.
4.4 The Toolkit of Virtues for Gene Editing Decision-Makers in Aotearoa New
Zealand
1) Pono (Integrity in Transparency. Encompases Vallor’s ‘Honesty’)
This is reflective of the Māori value of tika, the right way of doing things. For gene
editing specifically this may look like appropriate transparency between
decision-makers and the information shared with the agents affected by particular
decisions and the public more broadly. This includes the requirement to disclose
any personal agendas, conflicts of interest or biases that may exist amongst
decision-makers. Therefore, a virtue reflecting honest and transparent processes is
essential.
For example, if a decision-maker is the parent of a child who has a particular
condition and has chosen not to genetically alter their child, they may have a bias
towards declining any application from another parent who wishes to edit out such a
gene in their children. This is not to say that the decision-maker would be
automatically disqualified from sitting on a panel of decision-makers, but they
would be required to disclose and seek counsel where appropriate regarding any
potential conflict of interest.
Virtue ethics is able to accommodate for emotions within moral decision-making
and therefore should be robust enough to accommodate for such issues when they
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arise. This virtue also includes having clear and transparent practices with regard to
the uses of CRISPR and their observed outcomes. It involves continued oversight
into all credible research, including close attention to longitudinal studies that
monitor outcomes of gene editing. Decision-makers need to be able to explain to
wider governing bodies and the general public the recommendations they make and
provide clear rationale behind them. This includes full disclosure of the resources
consulted in making decisions and any organisational affiliations that may have been
instrumental in the decision-making process.
2) Mōhiotanga: (Creative and Critical Thought. Encompases Aristotle’s
Intellectual Virtues and Vallor’s ‘Flexibility’)
Creative thought is essential to be able to expand and consider a wide range of
possibilities through CRISPR. Creativity in making morally sound decisions in novel
cases that arise with gene editing applications opens the way for decision-makers to
stay abreast of developing technologies. It also demands that decision-makers stay
up to date with the technologies as they develop so that they are able to see how
existing policies can be applied in relevant ways to situations as they arise.
Decision-makers must possess the ability to think outside of established norms
regarding the potential consequences of any applications, particularly in light of the
novel moral dilemmas likely to arise in this area.
Creative thinking speaks to a flexibility in decision-makers’ ability to handle their
approach to gene editing. As there is no handbook of consequences to look to for
guidance, decision-makers must possess an ability to skillfully adapt to each new
morally ambiguous or challenging situation. A proactive approach is founded on
flexibility and an openness to change based on a pursuit of the good. Creative
thinking in this context is not about bending rules or twisting truth. Rather, it is the
close attention to the realities of our changing environment. Flexibility is connected
with creative thinking because the ability to look beyond existing parameters and
entertain new possibilities is important for keeping with the pace of gene editing
technologies such as CRISPR.
Critical thought is equally important. Decision-makers must possess the confidence
and ability to evaluate any creative ideas and proposals with an honest and
intelligent appraisal of any known details pertaining to a particular case. This will
serve to keep creative thought accountable to rigorous examination. Challenging
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previously accepted or habitual processes is important when considering the future
of how, and if, we manipulate the human genome using CRISPR.
3) Mātātoa ki te Whakaiti (Courage with Humility. Encompasses Aristotle’s
‘Courage with Humility’, Vallor’s ‘Self Control’ and ‘Courage’)
Virtues of self-control, humility and courage in the right balance can work together.
Courage in combination with humility and self control will allow for a balanced view
to risk taking. This requires an acknowledgement that there are potentially real
benefits to be had through gene editing, which would otherwise be denied to people.
However, this must be tempered with the awareness that we have much to learn
about the risks involved and that we cannot be sure of the real world consequences.
A balanced view towards progress tempered with humility around the limitations of
CRISPR as it develops can therefore be encapsulated within one virtue concept.
I have previously mentioned that within Tikanga, leadership roles begin with
humility. This idea is key, particularly when facing the unknowns of CRISPR
applications in terms of the consequences, both short and long term. Decisions
should be led by a sense of whakaiti (humility), alongside a keen awareness of the
responsibility of ensuring human flourishing, and concern for whakapapa. This
extends to future generations.
For gene editing, decision-makers need to have the ability to think critically through
the possibilities that gene editing brings and employ the correct level of humility and
courage in making decisions, not only for the current generation but for generations
to come.
4) Tāria te wā Me Kaitiakitanga (Long-term Thinking and Guardianship.
Encompasses Vallor’s ‘Perspective’ and ‘Self Control’)
This virtue holds the need for a patient outlook when looking towards an uncertain
future. This long-term perspective reflects the concept of kaitiakitanga, the need for
sustainable guardianship (Harr, Roche & Brougham, 2018). Human flourishing
extends into future generations and this must be held as a central concern when
making decisions on gene editing. A collective awareness that spans towards a value
of caring for those who are to come after us, our whakapapa, is particularly
important for gene editing, as the ramifications of our actions today will affect others
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to come. Decision-makers must have the ability to discern the correct pace at which
we integrate CRISPR technology to human gene editing as it develops.
Guardianship in gene editing decisions might include setting appropriate limits on
enhancement through editing. This would require a clear definition of what is
considered ‘enhancement’ and oversight of new editing options as they emerge. This
is especially pertinent for decision-makers. They will need to recognise that it is
unwise to be overly confident in the idea that transcending the natural limitations of
our DNA will be for the betterment of humanity. However, decision-makers will also
need to avoid an overly pessimistic view of emerging technologies such as CRISPR
which could shut down any possibility for appropriate improvement and
advancement of humans that may provide lasting benefits.
5) Whanaungatanga (Care for Community Flourishing. Encompasses Vallor’s
‘Justice’, ‘Empathy’, ‘Care’ and ‘Civility’ and Aristotle's ‘Friendliness in Social
Conduct’ and ‘Righteous Indignation in the Face of Injury’)
Broadly speaking, whanaungatanga situates itself towards a collective focus on other
people, whether familial or in wider community but extends these considerations
intergenerationally, including acknowledging the depth and closeness of these
relationships (Roche, 2019). Whanaungatanga reflects a recognition of a wide range
of global perspectives and our unique place in this global community as New
Zealanders. This virtue includes the ability to discern and balance the needs of the
individual within a local community, and then expand this perspective to a wider
global context.
As raised earlier, Aristotelian virtue ethics has been criticised as being elitist and
egocentric (Simpson, 1992). Other systems of values are more collectivist, for
example, Confucianism presents an account of virtues which emphasises a collective
approach but is heavily focused on the collective being ‘levelled’ or tiered, for
example, family first and then progressing outwards to wider community in
diminishing levels of importance or priority (Vallor, 2016, ch 2). Buddhism carries a
collectivist approach and equal care for all living things, including animals and
insects as equal, taking the collective approach to its most demanding point (Valor,
2016, ch2). Similarly, whanaungatanga takes a more collectivist approach, extending
care and concern for the wellbeing of the community beyond the individual.
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Whanaungatanga provides a space that takes account of collective, complex
emotions and human biases that can influence ideas for how we should use CRISPR,
from medical intervention to enhancement and prevention of disease. For
decision-makers, this is necessary to moderate blunt, overly rationalised or purely
economic motivations towards the use of CRISPR, thereby keeping ‘humanity’ in the
human condition and guarding against the juggernaut of systemic processes.
Whanaungatanga strikes at the heart of gene editing issues for this reason. It is
appropriately focussed on others and includes the perspective of future generations.
Decisions made in favour of using some gene editing applications could drastically
improve equity by removing certain inborn disadvantages. However, it could worsen
injustice by allowing unequal access to such techniques through economic
inequalities which translate into unequal ability at a genetic level.
For decision-makers, whanaungatanga as part of justice is essential.
Decision-makers must be able to navigate the interests of both commercial
organisations and public access to technology. For example, should a company fund
and discover the ability to produce a certain gene expression through CRISPR, they
may wish to patent this particular gene for commercial purposes. When considering
the privatisation of genetic material, the issue takes on a whole new complexity, one
that could arguably be discussed at length in a separate project. However, it is worth
mentioning here as a prime example of why comprehensive understanding of justice
in terms of distribution of resources is required for decision-makers. Justice is also
particularly important when considering the intergenerational ramifications of gene
editing. Questions remain as to whether it is morally justified to alter the genetics of
those who have not yet been born and if this is an issue of hindering future bodily
autonomy.
For decision-makers in gene editing, I see care and empathy to be combined virtues
encapsulated within the concept of whanaungatanga. If decision-makers hold
whanaungatanga as a core virtue then they will be moved to consider and preserve
humanity and human flourishing in an ever changing landscape of genetically
modified people. Specifically, this will involve a high degree of care and empathy for
those members of society who may be adversely affected by gene editing practices.
Decision-makers must work to avoid making decisions based primarily around
economic or political pressures.
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6) Mātauranga (Wisdom. Encompassing all of the Virtues Including Aristotle's
‘Practical Wisdom’ and Vallor’s ‘Technomoral Wisdom’)
In this context, I view mātauranga as the ability to discern which virtues to employ
in any situation and the extent to which they should take effect. By way of analogy,
consider all the virtues as dials on a sound technician’s desk. Each dial that controls
a specific sound is set to a certain level on the board in order to generate the desired
overall sound. The technician is able to discern which dials to turn up or down as the
music plays in order to maintain quality sound throughout. Similarly, mātauranga is
the ability to know which virtues to employ in making specific decisions and how
they might interact with each other in each case. If someone were to be in possession
of all the other virtues but not this one, they may be a risk of basing decisions using
an improper balance of care and empathy when there should be a greater focus on
justice for instance.
4.5 Towards Utilising the Virtue Toolkit
The above set of virtues is motivated by the theoretical core of eudaimonia, both now
and with a concern for human flourishing into future generations. A critical analysis
of the virtues pertinent to gene editing in humans, specifically in light of developing
CRISPR applications is necessary to help build a framework which key
decision-makers will draw from. The analysis of the virtues within their cultural and
historical contexts serves to situate Aotearoa New Zealand within the debate and
allows for the cultivation of specific virtues that will promote human flourishing in
terms of whakapapa. A key aspect to note when approaching cases using this virtue
toolkit is the relationship between each of these attributes, specifically the level at
which each of the virtues is utilised in a particular case. Each virtue will express itself
differently in relation to the other virtues and to the case at hand. Depending on the
situation, some virtues will play a larger role in the decision-making process whilst
others may remain in the background of discussions. In the final chapter, I will
develop case examples to demonstrate how having the right mix of virtues in the
right degree can help the decision-making process for ethical challenges brought by
gene editing applications.
Having clarified what I identify as the virtues required for creating a toolkit for
decision-makers to use in morally ambiguous cases, I will now turn to the practical
application of these virtues, of which there are two pressing issues. First, how these
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virtues might apply to single cases and second, who the bearers of the virtues are. In
the next section, I will look to how one might go about selecting the decision-makers
and who the bearers of the virtues might be. I will also look to how governance might
be structured for such decision-makers. Then I will demonstrate how these virtues
might be practically applied through a case study.
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Chapter 5: The Problem of Employing Virtue Ethics in Addressing
Particular Cases
I have previously mentioned that virtue ethics is less discussed in the context of
applied ethics as a major normative theory when compared to more dominant
theories such as consequentialism or deontology. Thus, it is relatively rare to have
virtue ethics deployed in the context of ethical decision-making for gene editing. A
chief criticism of virtue ethics as a normative theory is that it does not give clear and
specific action guidance in morally ambiguous situations. In the previous chapter, I
outlined my toolkit of essential virtues for gene editing and gave reasons for
choosing these virtues. This chapter will illustrate how I envisage these virtues to be
applied in a practical setting.
5.1 Structuring Governance: Who are the Bearers of the Virtues?
When considering applying the virtues, it is necessary to first clarify who are the
bearers of the proposed virtues listed in Chapter 4, as there are a variety of
possibilities. For example, there will be stakeholders in a particular ethically
challenging gene editing case. These will be the people who are affected by a
potential edit, for example, the person to be edited (the subject), or the parents of
the person to be edited, their wider family and community and even future
generations (those affected). Second, there will be those who are to make decisions
regarding the use of gene editing technologies (decision-makers). Examples include,
but are not limited to, doctors, parents or guardians of the affected, or potentially
genetically edited agents, the genetically edited agents themselves, hospital boards,
ethics committees and government.
In any given scenario, the decision-makers and these other categories may overlap.
For example, sometimes the subject and the decision-maker for a specific gene edit
might be one and the same person. For the purpose of this project, however, the
focus is not on how virtuous the subject is, or might become, but how virtuous the
decision-makers are in each case.
Whilst outcomes of decisions may maximise happiness for the subject in a
consequentialist sense, this may not always be the case. The practice of exercising
the virtues in decisions will be reflected in the outcome, possibly resulting in
decreased utility for the subject, should they be declined a certain procedure. The
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virtues employed in the decision-making process must be utilised with a mind
towards the flourishing of both the subject and those affected.
It may be the case that performing some edits may result in more virtuous people
but this is not something that I see could be easily controlled or guaranteed. So
whilst the case may involve an individual subject, human flourishing includes a
collective view.
As outlined in chapter 2, because there is a lack of adequate policy around rapid,
cheap gene editing technology, it seems most urgent to focus on the virtues that key
decision-makers need to possess in order to navigate these situations. My proposed
toolkit of virtues was therefore chosen with a mind towards the kinds of people that
would be required to make decisions on gene editing technologies. I envisage the
decision-makers to operate in the capacity of a review board or panel such as what
exists in Aotearoa New Zealand today. These individuals will not necessarily be in
charge of implementing official government policies, but their role is primarily to
highlight the specific moral challenges that arise through gene editing technologies
and have the power to make official recommendations to the government. These
individuals, as well as possessing knowledge and qualifications in their respective
areas of expertise, such as philosophy, biotechnology, law, community and
indigenous knowledge, amongst many others, will possess certain virtues that align
them towards a common goal of human flourishing.
At this juncture, I will note that this project does not aim to guide decision-makers
towards the aim of producing a more virtuous society, however, it may well be that
by making virtuous decisions, society would be more likely to benefit. Virtue ethics is
not about “maximising virtues”, rather it is about the character traits that the moral
agent possesses that underpins their decisions. Recalling a problem of
consequentialism, that it is incredibly difficult to predict future outcomes, such that
we could not quantify those outcomes, it would be a strange move to attempt to
predict what will make for virtuous futures as well. Perhaps, forecasting might be
more closely aligned with very generalised, top down principles at government level,
in as much as they can attempt to predict long term outcomes, such as eradicating
less controversial diseases. This shows that there may be other normative systems at
play in decision-making, such as consequentialism. However, the assertion is that
virtue ethics should be an integral part of how we approach challenging ethical cases
in gene editing applications.
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Employing a virtues based framework will help to deal with the unique challenges
raised by gene editing in humans by grounding ethical dilemmas to a foundational
set of values by which actions can be taken. It allows for a variety of specific actions
and outcomes, however, the virtues themselves will be the measure by which these
decisions are to made. The decision-makers, having a clear understanding and
practice of these virtues will be able to base their decisions on these virtues and
determine, through collaborative discussion, recommendations toward policy and
law.
5.2 Putting Virtues into Practice: The Action Guidance Problem
When considering an ethical approach to applying gene editing technology in the use
of CRISPR, I have discussed the reasons why a rigid, external rule based system is
inadequate on its own. I have argued for a system that can incorporate flexibility in
an ethical theory based on internal principles. However, I acknowledge that one of
the main criticisms leveled at virtue ethics is the claim that it is not sufficiently
action guiding, leading to possible difficulties in applying it to specific, morally
ambiguous cases. This criticism requires addressing specifically in light of the
uncertainties that already exist and continue to emerge regarding morality and gene
editing. I suggest that a novel approach to this complex issue may lie in combining
virtue ethics with a framework specifically focussed on decisions regarding single
cases:  Casuistry.
5.2.1 Casuistry
Although similar to virtue ethics in that it does not hold to a specific formula for
right action, casuistry approaches ethical decision-making differently. Casuistry
focuses on specific details of cases as they arise and gives a method of making
practical decisions based on real life situations. The goal of casuistry is to convince
stakeholders on a specific issue that one particular course of action is more
favourable over others, thereby reaching practical, defensible conclusions over
epistemic certainty. The casuist does not aim to justify and advocate for a particular
moral norm in any or all circumstances (Jonsen, 1991). This means casuistry is
relatively user-friendly, in that it does not require decision makers to adhere to one
particular normative theory in making decisions, nor does it require one to refer to
others as experts on morality to make ethical judgements (Calkins, 2005).
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Once I had largely developed my framework and proposal for this thesis on the idea
of combining virtue ethics with casuistry, I found that this concept has been floated
before in Martin Calkins’ (2005) work, ‘How Casuistry and Virtue Ethics Might
Break the Ideological Stalemate Troubling Agricultural Biotechnology’. However,
this work has not had much attention in wider literature. Calkins (2005), argues that
it is necessary to employ a combination of virtue ethics and casuistry in making gene
editing decisions, because there are not yet sufficient historical references for gene
editing examples, nor do we have character exemplars who have emerged.
I agree with this assertion and advocate for this approach towards CRISPR
applications in humans, because the technology is both new and rapidly advancing.
However, Calkins' account offers suggestions pertaining to gene editing primarily for
applications in the food and agriculture industry, leaving significant issues
pertaining to CRISPR applications in humans unaddressed. Furthermore, Calkins
does not offer a comprehensive, structured plan for applying this framework. The
account that I am offering provides a more comprehensive framework which is
based on a curated set of values specific to human gene editing in Aotearoa New
Zealand.
I am proposing second order policy advice, namely that there should be less
directives at the first order, government level regarding any specific actions
smaller-level decision-makers should follow. In the following chapter I will expand
on how this might look. First, I will describe the key features and some issues with
casuistry, then show how it might be complementary to virtue ethics in specific
cases.
Because casuistry is concerned with finding practical solutions to moral dilemmas
based on particular features of each case, it is commonly employed as a method for
ethical decision-making within the medical community. Ethically difficult decisions
are approached in a specific series of steps, beginning with the particular case in
question and adapting what is considered right action to the circumstance.
Casuistry can work in conjunction with other ethical theories without being bound
by the principles specific to that theory.
Jonsen and Toulmin outline these steps in the process for working through a
particularly morally complex case (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988, ch.16). First, the
problem needs to be described in detail, including any specific individual moral
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obligations or viewpoints the stakeholders (such as medical patients) might have
that could be applied to the situation. This is the ‘Morphology’ step.
The second step, ‘Taxonomy’, involves identifying the type of case to which the
dilemma belongs, and situating it within the paradigm of existing right and wrong
conduct in similar dilemmas. Finally, once the problem has been described and
situated within a paradigm of similar types, using practical wisdom, a critical
analysis can be carried out and an action decided upon. For example, in a medical
setting, a patient (who is a minor) requires a life-saving blood transfusion, but the
patient's parents hold strong religious beliefs against such practices. The medical
ethics committee would have to weigh up the particulars of the case, compare it to
other cases of its kind and decide whether the religious beliefs of the parent should
be set aside in favor of possibly saving the child’s life through performing the
procedure.
The casuistry position is that ethical reasoning must be more practical rather than
theoretical, because in practical ethics, the most important considerations must be
towards judgements of particular cases, instead of concern for a theoretical or
general principle, argued to be central to other normative theories (Tomlinson,
1994). Casuistry focuses on the practical elements of a situation, making it more
likely that the patient in each case will benefit directly. By recognising the
individualism of the patient, including their medical history, lifestyle and even their
beliefs, casuistry gives a tailored approach to ethically difficult situations in the
medical field.
5.2.2 Key Criticisms and Problems for Casuistry
There are some key criticisms leveled at casuistry. It's important to understand that
casuistry involves giving up a number of standard ideas about how to approach such
morally ambiguous cases. For example, casuistry rejects the idea that decisions
should be universalized across different scenarios. This raises concerns over
relativism, in that ethically inconsistent decisions may result. John Arras (1991, p48)
discusses the risk of the casuist slipping into distorted ideology and losing the
critical element of analysis. This puts the casuist in a position where they may
overlook some difficult big picture issues such as ‘What kind of society do we want?’.
If one wanted a general approach to gene editing decisions nationwide, casuistry
may not appear ideal on its own, because each case is considered based on its
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particulars, rather than being subject to a core moral outlook. Furthermore, there
are time constraints on developing a new chain of moral reasoning for every
situation. Whilst this may work best for individuals, it may not be ideal when looking
towards a general approach to morally complex matters such as formulating gene
editing policy.
One further difficulty arises in the ‘Taxonomy’ step, which requires similar cases to
compare with. Gene editing through CRISPR is so new that there may not be
sufficient, or indeed any past cases to make comparisons with when deciding on a
course of action. The moral and ethical issues pertaining to gene editing are very
likely to be unique, at least while the technology is so new, and even into the future,
as the technologies develop so rapidly. It may be difficult to accrue sufficiently
similar cases to form an ethical paradigm.
Despite these criticisms, casuistry is user-friendly, in that it does not require
decision-makers to adhere to one particular normative theory in making decisions,
nor does it require one to refer to others as experts on morality to make ethical
judgements (Calkins, 2005).
5.2.3 The Virtue Ethics-Casuist Approach
At this point, much of the above concern can be addressed by adopting a particular
strategy. From now on in the thesis, I turn to propose a framework of second-order
policy advice, namely that there should be fewer directives at government level
regarding any specific decisions smaller-level decision makers should follow. This
means a casuist approach can be utilised on a case-by-case basis by localised
committees, where virtue ethics provides the value system and moral guidelines by
which decisions should be considered. In turn, this guidance from a normative
theory that is substantive in its own right may also mitigate concerns in instances
where the decision-making body lacks sufficient comparison cases.
When we consider each case according to its merits, it may still be that there are
virtues which enable a decision-maker to think more comprehensively about the
situation at hand. For example, if we were dealing with a particularly morally
contentious or sensitive case, it would be preferable to be able to think it through
with empathy. Whilst empathy is not directly involved in the reasoning process
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itself, it may be important for the manner in which the decision-maker engages with
the case.
Another way would be to approach morally ambiguous situations as a casuist, but
maintaining the idea that the better casuists are also virtuous, or in possession of
certain fundamental virtues. Combining the virtues pertaining to gene editing as
suggested in the previous chapter would give casuistry a more explicit theoretical
base from which to make decisions, particularly in the absence of a large number of
past cases to draw analogies from. In exchange, the demand from casuistry that
decisions need to be made within a practical and specific framework gives grounding
to the collection of virtues and situates them within a practical, real world setting.
This lessens concerns around virtues being insufficiently action guiding.
This project carries a focus on individual cases, but I am aware that these cases occur
within a wider context and are subject to national policies and laws. Therefore, for
approaching gene editing decisions, my suggestion is that the nationwide policy
should reflect a stance of utilising virtue ethics and casuistry when approaching
particular individual cases. These two systems work together to create a structured
framework, grounded in a set of virtues that allows the flexibility to approach
individual cases using casuist methods. The next section will discuss how this might
be applied.
5.3 Structuring Decision-Makers: From Nationwide Guidelines to Community
Groups.
Considering how the decision-makers should be structured and chosen, I will give
recommendations as to how decisions might be directed, initially at a national,
first-order governance level, on to second-order decision-making levels for
individual cases.
Because of the multitude of ethically complex factors likely to be involved in gene
editing cases and because the virtue ethics-casuist perspective recommends a
recognition of the nuances of each case, it does not follow that there should be a
specific government response or all-encompassing decision with regard to specific
applications of gene editing. What I suggest is a national response that is committed
to adhering to a virtue ethics-casuist approach to cases of gene editing as they arise,
devolving decision-making powers more towards second order smaller governance
74
bodies, such as local government agencies and ethics committees. This guidance
should include identifying and highlighting key virtues for decision-makers to
exemplify, thus avoiding the moral relativism that casuistry alone is vulnerable to. I
accept that at top level governance, consequentialist philosophies often play a
dominant role regarding the approach to policy making. That aside, considering the
unprecedented challenges we face with the emergence of cheap, user-friendly gene
editing through CRISPR specifically, I argue for a shift away from this rule based
approach and to one where particular decisions regarding specific cases should be
left to smaller governing bodies, with greater ability to respond to unique aspects of
those cases.
This might involve the government setting upper limits on how far one can use gene
editing in terms of disease cures, through to enhancement techniques. For example,
it may be fairly straightforward to look at approving the use of gene editing for cases
such as eradicating Huntington’s Disease or some cancers from genetic lines. In
these situations, the decision seems to be quite clear cut and less controversial.
However, when it comes to isolating and editing for conditions such as
Achondroplasia (Dwarfism), this may require a more cautious, yet open approach.
These more nuanced cases require critical engagement across socio economic,
political and cultural lines, more so than for the eradication of a clearly categorised
‘disease’. I acknowledge that it is beyond the scope of this project to specify what
these exact boundaries might entail, however, the work of the RSNZ Panel on gene
editing as discussed in chapter 2 has gone some way to suggest what some of these
limits may be when it comes to editing the human genome. It is, however, important
to note that the panel has made clear its desire for a regulatory system in Aotearoa
New Zealand that has an easily navigable framework with clear and consistent
guidelines for assessing difficult cases (Royal Society Te Aparangi, 2019).
With an understanding of the need for what broader, top-down boundaries could
look like, the next step is to discuss how smaller groups of decision-makers could be
structured. Those groups who would be dealing directly with cases, such as ethics
committees in hospitals or research groups, will need to apply a principled approach
to specific moral details of each case.
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5.4 Second-Order Governance: The Decision-Makers
Once national directives have been established, there is a need to decide what
second-order governance should look like. If we are to devolve more
decision-making power to smaller governing bodies, the way these groups are
selected and structured  are of great importance.
As a collective, decision-makers should encompass the virtues of the previously
outlined collection in chapter 4, however the degree of said virtues may express
themselves to varying degrees within each individual. Therefore, diversity amongst
individual decision-makers is vital. Diversity in this context is not simply referring to
diversity for its own sake. The diversity amongst these decision-makers must be
relevant to the particulars of the case. For example, there must be provisions made
for the bicultural context of Aotearoa New Zealand, but also including relevant
diversity in relation to the cases at hand. This is not just about accommodating
various people’s views, it is recognising that the more varied the perspectives
involved, the more robust the virtue ethics approach will be, regardless of the issue
at hand. A wider range of relevant perspectives may uncover issues that a less
diverse group may overlook.
It is also necessary to ensure the various perspectives fit the specific setting, such as
the time, place or subject under discussion. So, if the decision-makers were
considering a case of editing out the gene for Achondroplasia for instance, there
must be provision for those who live with Achondroplasia to be included in making
these decisions. This does not assume that those individuals who are included for
this specific case are more virtuous, but it does show the importance of being able to
apply the virtues at a relevant and practical level with the perspectives of those for
whom the individual case may hold great significance and personal relevance.
This is not to say that those who are not connected to the case directly should have
no say. All affected agents will be part of a wider community and therefore their
interactions with the wider community, must be taken into account. It is not just the
agent and their close connections we need to consider, but the broader impact on
their environment and society.
Decision-makers should also be selected for their knowledge and experience in the
fields including but not limited to, science and technology, philosophy, politics, law
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and public health. They will possess a comprehensive understanding of a well
understood goal of ‘human flourishing’. Those selected should have extensive
training in understanding and applying specific virtues in practice, particularly in
difficult or ambiguous situations.
5.5 Indigenous Voices
In setting up what the decision-making committees should look like and who should
be included within the context of Aotearoa New Zealand, there are some key
considerations to be made with regard to cultural perspectives. Olivia Oldham’s
(2017) critical analysis of incorporation of Māori perspectives in gene editing forums
offers some key insights and strong criticisms on structuring such committees.
Based on this analysis and considering the way government policy and ethics
committees have been structured in the past, there are some key things I wish to
avoid in this context.
First, Olham refers to a detrimental, over-spiritualized view of Māori values and
concepts within government policy that lends it to being easily sidelined in the
fallout of ‘rational’ decisions.
“Because of its perceived objectivity and universality, science is able to
dominate debates which are culturally deemed to be scientific. Thus,
‘unscientific perspectives relating to ethical, cultural and spiritual matters are
able to be disregarded or significantly diminished in weight.” (Oldham, 2017,
p.12-13).
“The acknowledgement of the current rational scientific bias would open up
space for a fair consideration of concerns that don’t fit within the dominant
paradigm.” (Oldham, 2017, p.25).
This approach to Māori perspectives in governance is arguably a potential driver for
tokenism within policy. Developing concepts centered on Māori perspectives may go
some way to avoiding this issue.
Second, Oldham discusses the failure to adequately consult Māori in both the setting
up of policies and in the decision-making process (Oldham, 2017, p.14). She asserts
that Māori have been wrongly viewed as advisors to the Crown rather than partners
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with the Crown, creating an imbalance of power preventing Māori perspectives from
being adequately considered in decisions.
I agree with Oldham in opposing the idea that Māori should be consulted rather
than on an equal footing with other decision-makers in the process. From the very
beginning, decisions should be made in partnership through diverse and egalitarian
representation of each case at hand. Here I recognise that claims regarding the right
ways to include indigenous perspective should come from an indigenous voice. I
cannot speak with the appropriate level of authority nor assume to know everything
about any cultural perspective on gene editing policy in Aotearoa New Zealand other
than my own. However, this is in support of my reasoning for having appropriate
diversity amongst decision-makers.
Cultural resilience can be encouraged through the mutual recognition of the validity
of each culture’s body of knowledge and the investigation of the basis of different
opinions. This enables knowledge exchange and cultural development. Oldham
states that framing decision-making in this way can enable healthy disagreement
and conversation, of the likes that has been raised throughout the gene editing
debate (Oldham, 2017, p.26). Varying perspectives should be seen as an opportunity
to create new forms of knowledge and understanding, which can lead to more
productive and positive outcomes.
5.6 Approaching Cases
I have described how virtue ethics and casuistry might be complimentary in
decisions pertaining to CRISPR applications in humans. Having discussed how
governance of these decisions might be structured and how decision-makers might
be selected, I will now turn to illustrate how this might look in practice. I have
chosen these particular cases in the following chapter to show how my toolkit of
virtues identified in chapter 4, combined with casuistry may be applied. The aim is
that this approach will help decision-makers see contentious gene editing issues in a
more nuanced and comprehensive way.
78
Chapter 6: Case Study
When approaching the case studies, it is important to note that this is not an attempt
to solve these issues. The primary point is to demonstrate that virtue ethics has a
role to play within the context of gene editing technologies in Aotearoa New Zealand.
Some of these questions warrant full analysis of their own, outside of this project.
The intention is to highlight that individual decisions are best considered in full
context, by a group of diverse people possessing a specific set of virtues which
inform their moral decision-making.
6.1 Case: Cure or Homogenisation? An Analysis of Huntington’s Disease and
Achondroplasia (Dwarfism)
As outlined earlier in this project, one of the most promising features of CRISPR is
the possibility of eradicating serious diseases from family lines. However, this raises
the issue of which conditions are considered ‘diseases’ in the human genome. The
following case outlines how virtue ethics and casuistry can respond to this issue by
comparing two conditions, Huntington’s Disease and Achondroplasia. The response
to one condition appears to be fairly straightforward and I have included this as a
comparison with another condition that is significantly less clear cut and
contentious, in order to demonstrate how the debate may be seen in a more nuanced
way through a virtue ethics-casuist approach.
First, I will outline the issue and set it out within a casuist framework. Second, I will
discuss the virtues in relation to the issue, showing how they might be employed in
this debate to guide decision-makers. It is also worth noting that in a real case, there
will be much more detail than what can be included here. This additional
information will be significant and would help to attain a more definite result.
The Neurological Foundation (2019) describes Huntington’s disease as an inherited
brain disorder that causes cells in some brain areas to die, resulting in mental and
physical impairments. This disorder is caused by an expansion of CAG
(cytosine-adenine-guanine) repeats in the DNA code. This produces an abnormal
protein that gradually causes the gene to malfunction and neurodegeneration to
occur. Symptoms can include issues with mood or affect, coordination and
movement, loss of speech and eventually dementia and premature death. About one
in every 10,000 people has Huntington’s, however the ramifications of the disease
79
are said to affect one in every 1,000, taking into account at risk individuals,
caregivers and extended families.
One of the key issues with Huntington’s Disease is that a person with the gene
mutation most often only exhibits the symptoms later on in life, meaning that a
person may reproduce and pass on the disease before they are even aware they have
it.
Consider a case of a couple wishing to eradicate the gene for Huntington's Disease
based on the evidence of one parent having the gene for it. There is a 50% chance
that their offspring will be born with the condition as a result (The Neurological
Foundation, 2019). Should they bear a child with Huntington’s disease, their
offspring will face significant physical, mental and psychological impairments. There
currently is no known medical cure for Huntington’s. However, the arrival of
CRISPR has renewed hope for the eradication of this disease through a selective
gene edit in the germline.
Now, consider a scenario of a couple who have a higher than average chance of
bearing children with Achondroplasia. Achondroplasia is a common form of
dwarfism caused by a mutation in the genomic sequence that results in a glycine to
arginine substitution (Miao, et.al, 2019). Physical signs of Achondroplasia are
shortened limbs on a torso that is of typical length and in some cases an enlarged
head. Complications listed with Achondroplasia can include issues with sleep
apnoea, increased risk of cardiovascular disease, lordosis (curved lower spine), poor
muscle tone, loose joints, frequent middle ear infections that can contribute to
hearing loss, delayed developmental milestones and higher rates of insulin
resistance (de Bruin and Dauber, 2016). Through CRISPR, the ability to isolate and
suppress the gene for Achondroplasia has been trialled with some success in mice
(Miao, et.al, 2019). Researchers are now considering an edit using CRISPR-Cas to
‘knock out’ this phenotype in the mice offspring.
Depending on one’s values and perspective, Achondroplasia might be considered
either a disability or simply one way of being human. Rebecca Cokely is a former
representative for the National Council for Disability in the United States. She also
has Achondroplasia. In her 2017 piece for the Washington Post, Cokely makes the
argument that potentially editing the gene for Achondroplasia is a threat to her
identity and to the identities of others like her.
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“I am who I am because I have dwarfism. Dwarfs share a rich culture as do
most disability groups. We have traditions, common language and histories
rich in charismatic ancestors. I can honestly say that I may not have been
able to work in the White House doing diversity recruitment for President
Barack Obama had I not been born a little person. It allowed me to
understand discrimination, isolation and society’s lowered expectations.”
(Cokely, 2017).
6.2 A Casuist Approach
Recall that the casuist approaches cases with a view to analysing the particulars of
the scenario in a series of specific steps: ‘Morphology’, (an outlay of all the relevant
details of the case), ‘Taxonomy’ (comparing it to similar cases or situation it within a
paradigm), and ‘Analysis’ (culminating the previous two steps for a decision to
action).
6.2.1 Morphology:
In the scenario pertaining to Huntington's Disease, the parents have the means and
desire to eradicate genes for the condition from their potential offspring and in any
future descendants. They are aware that the disease is degenerative with no known
cure and is genetically inherited. There is evidence that one parent has the gene for
Huntington's, so there is a significant chance of passing it to their offspring. Those
affected by this case include future generations, other people who interact with the
parents and their offspring, those directly concerned with the care of the family
including medical professionals and other community service providers. It is notable
that some agent’s choices will be limited by this decision, particularly the potential
offspring in that the edit may (or may not be) be done on their behalf, which will
affect their life in future. This shows that the decision-makers will need to reliably
account for the preferences of others regarding this issue.
For Achondroplasia, researchers have the ability to isolate and therefore potentially
edit out the gene within the germline. Considerations around societal attitudes and
interpretations of Achondroplasia will need to be taken into account should parents
begin to selectively edit this gene from the germline. It is possible that there are
people who would, if given the option, choose to have this edit performed for their
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offspring and future family line, possibly even parents who are living with
Achondroplasia and who do not wish to continue this in their offspring. From a risk
standpoint, there remain concerns around off target effects and mosaicism, although
CRISPR techniques are continually being refined and improved for both efficacy and
safety. Maintaining the ability to do this with fewer off target mutations is
improving.
6.2.2 Taxonomy:
For Huntington’s, this type of case fits most closely within the area of human gene
editing for medical treatment purposes. Huntington’s does not appear to have any
possible desirable features. This is a degenerative disease and therefore removal of
the Huntington gene is not an enhancement of an otherwise healthy life but a life
saving procedure. Additionally, one would be hard pressed to argue for having
Huntington’s disease as a desirable lifeway.
Without editing Huntington’s from the germline, parents who are aware they have
the gene can opt not to bear children on the chance that their offspring inherit this
disease. There are those who may decide to continue with the option to have
children. Should they bear a child with Huntington’s, due to a lack of treatment
options, other than management of the disease to slow its progression, the potential
cure lies in eradication within the germline. The gene for Huntington’s can be
isolated and therefore potentially edited. There is evidence that by using
CRISPR-Cas9, scientists can treat the disease by editing out this gene mutation with
a single dose (Eisenstein, 2018). There is also the option to avoid germline edits by
suppressing symptoms in a person who has Huntington’s using specific edits into
the individual (somatically) and slow the disease's progression, thereby not affecting
future generations (Budworth, et.al, 2015). The taxonomy parameters for
Huntington’s are therefore that it can - but does not have - to affect the offspring.
With a germline edit, this will lead to complete eradication of the disease in that
later lineage.
In the case of Achondroplasia, there are presently no known cases of gene editing to
remove the responsible gene being carried out in a human embryo. Unlike
Huntington’s Disease, it is not clear that Achondroplasia constitutes a harm with no
perceivable benefits. More importantly, some people with Achondroplasia see this as
just another way of being a human. Given these differences, unlike Huntington’s,
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some people might later on regret that they were prevented from having
Achondroplasia.
Whilst there are no past cases to compare it to, there is a plethora of literature on the
subject that could inform the paradigms and concerns of this case. There are cases
where it is clear that societal values have determined that certain lifeways are less
desirable. The selective termination of foetuses screened for having Trisomy 21
(Down’s Syndrome) (Gottfreðsdóttir, & Björnsdóttir 2010) is one example, as is
selective abortions of female fetuses in India (Arnold, Kishor and Roy, 2002). These
are all performed with a certain idea of the ‘better way to be a human’ or what ‘the
better life’ is within these cultural contexts. The parameters for Achondroplasia are
therefore complex and dependent on individual, cultural and societal views on what
is ‘the better way’ to be a human. That is, one may not necessarily think it is wrong to
have Achondroplasia, but still think it is somehow worse than not having
Achondroplasia. In this case there are strong arguments to be made as to possible
desirable features of Achondroplasia, in terms of personal and cultural identity and
social connection. Therefore, it is not clear cut that we are as firmly in the paradigm
of treating disease. Thus, there are arguments to be made that editing out
Achondroplasia is overstepping personal autonomy of future generations in a way
that is more difficult to justify than with Huntington’s.
6.3 Applying Virtues
Before moving to the final analysis stage, I will turn to how the virtues outlined in
chapter 4 may be applied to the case, showing how they can illuminate complexities
and give a broader picture of the issue at hand.
Pono  (Integrity in Transparency)
For Huntington’s, it seems as though this case is less controversial. However, it is
imperative that all potential conflicts of interest are disclosed by all decision-makers
and stakeholders in this issue. Eradication of disease does not mean
decision-makers should assume that choosing to perform the edit is straightforward.
It must first be agreed upon that Huntington’s is to be considered a disease without
any significant positive features. Full disclosure of information on the case and of all
interests of parties involved must be put forward, regardless of the case. Arguably, it
is even more imperative that cases appearing to be straightforward at face value
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should be closely scrutinised. This serves to mitigate any assumptions or hasty
decisions of any involved parties. If an issue appears simple, it may be that there are
some significant blindspots and rushed conclusions could be drawn. Transparency is
therefore key to proper procedure and due diligence towards any gene editing
decisions.
In the case of Achondroplasia, the complexity of the issues makes obtaining a clear
and consistent picture of the personal values and potential biases of all stakeholders
more difficult. Furthermore, it is important to note that any embryo to be
potentially edited, and in the case of germline editing, all the offspring are
stakeholders and holding this consideration in discussions concerning transparency
is vital. For example, it is likely that decisions of this nature may include strong
emotions and a variety of perspectives. Decision-makers would need to gather
honest perspectives from stakeholders on all sides of this issue. This includes having
transparent accounts regarding what people living with Achondroplasia see as
unique benefits and challenges in their lives concerning Achondroplasia. It will also
be important to include perspectives of family members and the community of
people with Achondroplasia and allow them to express the positive and more
challenging experiences with it. An open, inclusive discussion from stakeholders and
decision-makers must occur in order to be able to move with some level of
confidence toward a moral decision.
Mōhiotanga (Creative and Critical Thought)
In the Huntington’s case, it is important to critically analyse any available treatment
options aside from the edit itself. If there are alternative treatments in development
that include slowing the disease progression or even mitigating some of the
symptoms without altering the germline, this must be taken into account, as there
may be families that would prefer not to artificially alter their genetics. Although
difficult to imagine for the case of treating a degenerative disease, there are those
who may view a gene edit of any kind as somehow fundamentally altering or even
severing familial connections on a spiritual identity level for example. Even
considering that an edit to eradicate Huntington’s in a family line would constitute a
positive decision, it may be that the family lineage could be viewed as ending in one
sense, and a new family line containing altered genetics beginning, rather than the
same family line continuing on to subsequent generations. Holding a place for
creative thought around the identity of future generations and considering whether
to allow for an unaltered gene pool in future seems right. This is an important issue
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not to be overlooked. It will also be prudent to critically analyse any reported risks or
concerns with performing the edit, both from a medical and ethical standpoint. For
the purpose of attaining the correct analysis of the case details and to ensure that
broad perspectives from all agents are heard, critical thought is a necessary virtue in
this instance.
Unlike Huntington’s, Achondroplasia is not clearly a disease or a phenotype that has
no positive features. This problematises the issue significantly because
decision-makers need to determine whether to view this case as an example of
breakthrough technology or one that moves us closer to eugenics. There needs to be
serious thought into whether editing the gene for Achondroplasia is advocating for
an idealised, ‘better kind of person’ to be, overlooking the idea that having
Achondroplasia may be a legitimate lifeway in and of itself. However, if refusing the
edit meant the couple decided to discontinue a pregnancy, that might make
performing the edit a potentially life-saving decision. Clear definitions of ‘disability’
and ‘enhancement’ will need to be considered and determined in order to critically
evaluate the information and arguments  presented.
Mātātoa Ki Te Whakaiti (Courage with Humility)
Recognising the potential for risks both known and unknown outcomes is imperative
in these cases. Exercising the courage in deciding to perform the edits when they are
warranted is important but must be weighed with the humble awareness that all of
the possible consequences cannot be calculated. It is already established that
CRISPR is still developing as a technology and the possibility of off target mutations
remains a concern. Huntington’s may be a well understood condition, however there
are risk factors involved with gene editing, particularly with germline editing that
must be held seriously. A decision to move forward with any procedure, particularly
one that affects future generations will always require courage in the face of such
risk.
This is also true for Achondroplasia, however, it requires even greater courage,
especially when there are some arguments for the unique benefits of living with
Achondroplasia. To make a choice either way, being to allow or deny an edit of this
nature will take courage because this case is very contentious. Either act will likely
cause upset or disappointment to one or more stakeholders. Decision-makers need
to have the courage after honest, critical and creative thought and discussion to
clearly move in a direction. The consequences of such an edit, particularly in the
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long term cannot truly be calculated, therefore decision-makers will need to be in
possession of the virtue mātātoa ki te whakaiti. It is worth noting that possessing or
being trained in developing this and other virtues will serve the decision-makers
well, both in themselves as effective decision-makers. They will be able to make
confident decisions without excessive fear or recklessness.
Tāria te wā me Kaitiakitanga  (Long-Term Thinking and Guardianship)
Considering the known long term effects of Huntington’s, decision-makers would
likely err in favour of performing a germline edit. However, it is important that
decision-makers consider the whakapapa of the agents in future generations and
how an edit of this nature may affect them. Although difficult to imagine, there is
still the possibility that some stakeholders disagree with performing the edit on the
grounds of preserving the natural family line. However, preserving the family line by
means of gene editing could arguably increase the flourishing and health of families
both now and into the future. Concerns of this nature must be taken into account,
however, when combined with the exercising of the other virtues, it may take a less
prominent role for this case.
More contentious issues demand a more nuanced perspective regarding future
people and so this virtue will be of greater importance in the case of Achondroplasia.
There are positives with regard to culture, social connections and practices amongst
those who are born with Achondroplasia that may need to be considered as being
aspects of whakapapa to be preserved over the long term, into future generations
and held as valuable to future communities. There are also some physical and social
difficulties in living with Achondroplasia. This may not necessarily be considered as
something to be “fixed” by gene editing. This may be part of a wider discussion
around equality and respect for diverse ways of being in society. It is therefore
essential to approach cases that are contentious with a view to the wider social
aspects at play both now and into the future and evaluate whether a change needs to
be made. For example, we may reflect on what the future may look like if the edit
was made, or if the edit was not done but instead we considered what changes could
be made to society that might mitigate some of the difficulties faced by those who
have Achondroplasia. Although it is not possible to fully calculate consequences as a
basis of our decisions (as stated in chapters 2 and 3), it is still essential to hold these
considerations alongside the practice of virtuous decision-making. The possessors of
kaitiakitanga would be effective at including these concerns in the decision-making
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process. If a change must be made, it should then be decided whether it should
happen in the form of a gene edit or amongst social and cultural spheres.
Whanaungatanga (Concern for Civic and Community Flourishing):
Social and economic disadvantages for the offspring with Huntington’s would be an
important consideration. Although the symptoms of Huntington’s are seen in
adulthood and the consequences of the disease progression is death, it is important
to note that any treatment, even the likes of palliative care for example may cost the
subject, their family and the wider community on emotional, social and economic
levels. Given these concerns, the virtue of whanaungatanga, including appropriate
empathy and care for both the parents wishes and the high risk of negative effects on
the offspring later in life if they are born with the gene for Huntington’s should be
taken into account. Decision-makers possessing the virtue of whanaungatanga
would be better equipped to make a good decision regarding such cases.
For Achondroplasia, whanaungatanga is concerned with acknowledging and
discussing the impact a diagnosis of Achondroplasia would have on people’s families
and in wider society and vice versa. First, it would require an investigation on
whether there would be any material or practical costs involved, for example, special
healthcare needs and whether there are sufficient resources within the families,
communities or at a government level to support these needs should they arise.
Second, an analysis of the social costs are necessary. Social costs include thinking
through the contributions those with Achondroplasia may be able to offer society
such as a unique perspective on social issues and maintaining a diverse population.
Furthermore, it is important to consider the social costs involved in having less
diverse communities, including whether performing these kinds of edits on a
broader scale runs the risk of a slippery slope towards genetic homogeneity.
Mātauranga (Wisdom Encompassing all of the Virtues)
Knowing how to exemplify the various virtues is expressed through this virtue. In
the case of Huntington’s, there appear to be only negative features in having this
disease, but there are always risks involved in any procedure, even when performing
potentially life saving gene edits. Mātauranga in this case will serve to take a
balanced approach to the mātātoa that decision-makers may exercise towards
performing such an edit for example, ensuring that blind confidence does not
overshadow other important considerations. Although this case does not appear
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highly controversial, especially when compared with Achondroplasia, mātauranga
should always play a role in the decision-making process.
For Achondroplasia, decision-makers need to exercise mātauranga when accounting
for the stakeholders’ personal desires, one’s right to bodily autonomy (of both
parents and their offspring) and being appropriately concerned with the flourishing
of the individual and the community in which they live. Special considerations will
also need to be taken concerning upholding whakapapa and whether performing the
edit causes damage to, or enhances flourishing within the family line. With the right
social and health support it may be entirely feasible to have a child with
Achondroplasia. However, if the societal and even the familial stressors of having a
child with this condition are likely to cause harm to any offspring then mātauranga
will be essential here, as multiple considerations will need to be carefully balanced in
employing the other virtues relevant to the appropriate degree.
6.4 Casuist Analysis:
For Huntington’s, it is difficult to imagine many strong objections to performing a
germline edit, given the known negative effects of this disease as detailed in the
morphology and taxonomy of the case. Huntington’s puts one at a significant
physical, mental, psychological and social disadvantage later in life with the prospect
of premature death. Alternatively, it is impossible to ensure that a family line will
not pass on the gene other than by opting out of reproduction. To recommend that a
family opt out of reproducing seems harsh, particularly given that a potential
treatment can be made possible through CRISPR. Having Huntington’s poses a
significant health risk. The parents, having ownership of and autonomy over their
reproductive cells may have a say over how their cells are used. However, it is
necessary to balance the parents’ interests and rights against the interests and rights
of their children and future generations more generally. Granted, performing this
particular edit does override autonomy from the offspring with regard to their
biological makeup. In this case it seems an acceptable option to go ahead with the
edit as it most clearly falls within the paradigm of treating human diseases.
However, even in such an example, casuistry cautions us that this cannot be a
blanket approval to perform such edits. The details of individual cases may well be
significant enough to warrant a different approach. In other more difficult or
ambiguous cases, the issue of ownership over germ cells will hold much greater
significance. In this apparently less controversial case the virtue of mātātoa would
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likely mean decision-makers would find in favour of performing the edit. However,
the details of each case as it arises shows the need for mātauranga in responding
appropriately to the framework outlined in the steps of the casuist process.
For Achondroplasia, the parents, having ownership and autonomy of their
reproductive cells may again have a say over how these cells are treated. It is unclear
whether they have autonomy or decision-making powers over their potential
offspring in this case. Whilst this issue was less controversial in the Huntington's
case, it is much more difficult to make a decision-here. The parents have a
responsibility for the wellbeing of the child but it is more difficult to determine
whether performing the edit is morally right or wrong or whether it infringes on any
potential offspring’s right to have altered or unaltered genetics.
This case links to the philosophical debate between Transhumanism and
Bioconservatism in chapter 2. It would be difficult for the Bioconservatist to claim
that using CRISPR to perform such an edit is dehumanising in the case of
Huntington’s, especially when compared to the effects on a person who is living with
the disease. However, when considering Achondroplasia, it is not as easy for the
Transhumanist to claim complete victory in the debate on using technology to
transcend human limitations. There are those who passionately feel that it is
dehumanising to perform an edit to remove the instances of Achondroplasia, as it is
seen to be removing a key part of what gives their life meaning (Cokely, 2017). These
kinds of cases show the importance of understanding the underlying values at play
in such circumstances. However, those claiming ‘dehumanisation’ through an edit
should take into account the effect of any other related health, social and cultural
risks to the person born with Achondroplasia as discussed previously in the
‘Morphology’ of the case. On this basis, the Bioconservatist would therefore have to
work harder to justify the argument for dehumanisation through such an edit. The
‘Taxonomy’ of this case indicated that there are no other cases so far to draw
comparisons from, however, there may well be cases from which to draw from in
future. ‘Taxonomy’ is therefore important in building a detailed account of the
results and contributing factors in any cases that may arise in future to aid in the
‘Analysis’. Here, virtues of pono (integrity in transparency), whanaungatanga
(concern for civic and community flourishing) and mātauranga (wisdom) come into
play for individual cases. Decision-makers would need to determine an honest
account of the parents’ potential fears and abilities to manage the effects of
performing or not performing the edit. There would need to be a thorough
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assessment of the support services available to the potential offspring in each case,
from economic to social supports both within the immediate family and their wider
community. Whanaungatanga would include asking questions of whether it is
favourable to have a society that shuns or favours certain lifeways over others for
example. Mātauranga is essential therefore in determining the correct balance of the
virtues as they apply within the framework of the case and then employ mātātoa ki te
whakaiti (courage with humility) in making the decision, taking into account the
known risks.
6.5 Summary from Case Studies
Working through the case, it is apparent that employing such virtues within a
casuist framework does not give a cut and dried answer or specific action guidance.
Whilst it may be true that this approach is not specifically action guiding, the
combination of casuist methods with virtue ethics does provide a comprehensive
way of illuminating various courses of action that could be taken within a practical
and defined context.
I maintain that the non-action guiding aspect of virtue ethics is a positive feature
and not a flaw, particularly in the area of rapidly improving and cheap gene editing.
There may be some cases where there appears to be no clear ‘right’ choice. The crux
of the argument is that there will be many ambiguities as further possibilities open
up through gene editing technologies and the moral path may therefore be unclear. I
do not propose the virtue ethics-casuist approach as a perfect answer to such
conundrums. However, it is a useful approach to consider, particularly in the setting
of individual cases, alongside calculations of utility or moral rules for illuminating a
broader picture of the multiple factors at play in the face of the ethically complex
challenges that CRISPR presents. Even though there may be no easy answers, a
virtue ethics-casuistry approach could be an effective tool to get us closer to the
answers and be in a position to accommodate the ambiguities that remain. I have
demonstrated working through these cases that this approach does maintain its
structure and integrity as a theory. It does expand our considerations beyond
paradigms of calculations and formulas of loss and gain, life or death, happiness or
unhappiness. Virtue ethics combined with casuistry serves to broaden the scope of
our considerations to make a decision on specific action.
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Conclusion
The ethics of gene editing is not a new debate. However, this work has shown that
the advent of new gene editing technologies has increased the urgency for new
approaches and decisive action on how we address it. CRISPR in particular has
opened a new world of possibility, from potentially curing some cancers to enabling
enhanced ways of being in the world. Importantly, CRISPR has made these
possibilities much more likely to arise in the near future and become more widely
available than previously anticipated. However, without careful management and
well informed, virtuous decision-makers, the potential for disaster remains a distinct
possibility.
This work has given an overview of the unique challenges and possibilities we face
through CRISPR, canvassing global and local responses to gene editing thus far. It
has shown the importance of reviewing our own response to CRISPR as New
Zealanders, highlighting the urgent need for updated policy on gene editing
applications.
How society forms policy is underpinned by personal and societal value systems that
are based in certain philosophical belief systems. That is to say, what we value as
individuals, will shape our collective attitudes and values, informing policy and laws
in support of those values.
The ethics on gene editing are inherently value laden, and this work has shown the
importance of investigating which values make up the basis of our decisions, those
values which shape our idea of human flourishing. I have argued for a flexible,
toolkit approach based on virtue ethics in combination with casuistry as a viable
method of informing those who are to make decisions on such contentious cases as
outlined in the final chapter. Rigid rule systems or calculations of utility will likely be
swamped by an inability to accurately calculate best utility, just as deontic moral
rules may lack the specificity to navigate complex and changing moral conundrums.
Virtue ethics acknowledges and makes room for human emotions and biases that
exist and will continue to exist in decisions that pertain to human nature and what it
means to flourish. The virtue ethics toolkit espoused in this work allows for real-time
flexibility, whilst maintaining a stable core of values on which to base such real-time
decisions.
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This project has highlighted the need for further study into the use of virtue
ethics-casuist perspectives for gene editing cases going forward, particularly in light
of the existing gene editing policies in Aotearoa New Zealand which have not been
formally revised in more than two decades.
The virtues outlined in this work do not aim to give explicit action guidance. They
allow an expansive view on the myriad of contributing factors and complexities of
numerous stakeholders in such decisions. Our response to CRISPR is a matter of
urgency. Further discussion is needed regarding how we navigate ourselves in a
world where what was once only theoretical is now possible. Looking to the virtues
in decision-making processes will allow a flexible approach to each case, whilst
grounding such decisions in a common goal of flourishing, brought by the continued
cultivation and practice of the essential virtues as proposed in this work.
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